AMERICA AND THE EMERGING EUROPE
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soon as the
Wende
evoked the question of the moral and intellectual
legitimacy of the East German (and East European) intelligentsia, a new
alliance was born. Former dissidents or semi-dissidents were united with
the former establishment in their protest against West Germans. Both
official and unofficial elements of the post-Communist intelligentsia
discovered, much to their surprise and chagrin, that the new criteria for
professional selection were neither political nor moral, nor the
guaranteed right of life-long employment at one's alma mater, but
merely the market situation in a given field, individual expertise, and
some less rationally explicable factors . This discovery still haunts them.
In 1988, the Bielefeld sociologist Niklas Luhmann stated that Eastern
European intellectuals, due to their long-term isolation, suffer from se–
vere methodological shortcomings in their respective fields, and show lit–
tle ability to conceptually work on their own. But, Luhmann continued,
once they could use their practically acquired knowledge of the Com–
munist system, they could offer new insights that no Western intellectual
could. Unfortunately, this prediction has not come true. This is at least
partly due to the clumsiness of the debate. The often contradictory na–
ture of the transformational processes was not differentiated enough. So
far, the discussion of Germany's reunification and future, including that
of its post-Communist intellectuals, has mainly helped in the reproduc–
tion of stereotypes. A new sobriety, a departure from previously cher–
ished naive notions, seems necessary, both for post-Communist German
intellectuals and for everyone involved in the discussion on Germany in
general.
Wilfried von Bredow:
The new world order of 1945 as reflected in
the Charter of the United Nations did not materialize. Instead, the East–
West conflict became the Cold War. For the Germans, this development
meant a threat and an opportunity. A threat, because the division of
Berlin, of Germany, of Europe, and, to a certain degree, of the world
submerged the chances for reunification. An opportunity (although in a
rather asymmetrical balance between the FRG and the GDR) , because
the Cold War converted yesterday's loser of the war into today's ally in
the Cold War. For West Germany, this was the beginning of a success
story. For East Germany, it was much less glamorous, but it provided
some sort of reward. No one really likes to remember this, but people
from the GDR often prided themselves that they were more or less the
only people who could make socialism work. They failed to do so, but
their political leaders were comparatively successful in projecting such an
image to their own society and even to outside observers.
