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been able to establish before 1989. Many of them intimidated their
younger, dependent colleagues, maintaining that only under their leader–
ship would they be able to continue their careers. Incoming information
about grants, positions, and conferences was passed on only to colleagues
who proved submissive. Some Western intellectuals who felt uneasy
about their supposed intrusion tried to help those who presented
themselves as East Germany's intellectuals who had suffered under the
regIme.
West German academics complained about high unemployment,
overabundance of students, decreasing quality of teaching, and lack of
intellectual achievement in a bureaucratized state. Both sides were dissat–
isfied. The eventual merger of the two German academies was amelio–
rated by a number of factors: the multifarious connections between po–
litical structures and university administrations; the achievement of the
privileged, lifelong, unchallenged status of professor as the ultimate goal
for intellectuals; the complete absence of student feedback regarding the
quality of teaching; and the existence of old-boy networks in the nomi–
nation and appointment of new professors and in long-term career plan–
ning. Some demagogues even used these similarities in order to claim
that both systems were equally unjust. What was less obvious and thus
often forgotten by both sides was the fact that the East German intelli–
gentsia entered the merger with its counterpart as a highly centralized,
and almost homogeneous force, whereas West German academe has been
more decentralized and quite diverse.
As the American historian S. Frederick Starr recently pointed out
regarding the Soviet intelligentsia, the notion that they are victims of
the totalitarian system is wrong. In many respects, the official
intelligentsia was always quick to get rid of its dissenting members. With
little hesitation, the Communist intellectual establishment took advan–
tage of its position: its members received relatively high salaries; they
could work in interesting fields; they could travel to the West as official
representatives. Only in the 1980s when the socialist economies began to
deteriorate badly, when the living standard was determined by the under–
ground market of direct exchange rather than by the amount of money
they had, only then did these privileges count for less. At this very
moment some sort of identity crisis made many intellectuals think of
alternatives, usually formulated in Gorbachovean terms. By the middle of
the 1980s, a few disquieting questions began to be raised in Party
schools, trade union meetings, and in personal discussions. This does not
mean, however, that a serious process of social reforms was anticipated
or demanded. Most critical intellectuals were hoping for moderate
reforms, not for a radical abolition of the Communist system. Thus, as
