HOW CAN GERMANY DEFUSE ITS NEIGHBORS' FEARS?
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nia and Croatia since the summer of 1991, despite the EC's publicly pro–
claimed policy that no unilateral acts of secession would be recognized
by the international community and that there would be no recognition
of new states before all issues among the former Yugoslav republics were
settled in good faith. This was a time of intense bargaining, not only be–
tween Yugoslav republics at war with each other but also among the
twelve European partners who were getting ready for the famous Maas–
tricht summit. Maastricht was a success: To ensure it, Germany made sig–
nificant concessions, allowing Great Britain to opt out of the Social
Charter and give up its formidable currency in favor of the European
Currency Unit (ECU). Payback time came seven days later, in Brussels.
The crucial moment I witnessed in Germany's drive for the recogni–
tion of Slovenia and Croatia came a week after Maastricht. It was a sev–
enteen-hour-long session of the Council of Ministers of the European
Community in Brussels, beginning on December 16th and lasting until
Genscher was able to extract his partners' reluctant promise to follow
the German lead in recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. This finally hap–
pened between 2 a.m. and 3 a.m., the morning of December 17th, 1991.
A tired but victorious Genscher emerged to announce that the foreign
ministers of twelve EC countries had reached a unanimous decision to
recognize the independence of all former Yugoslav republics by January
15th, 1992. He also announced that Germany would recognize Croatia
and Slovenia "before Christmas."
Germany had threatened to unilaterally recognize the breakaway re–
publics, which was an absolute taboo in the European Community. It
still is, but back then the stakes somehow seemed higher, and preserving
appearances mattered more. The European Community still had high
hopes of salvaging its credibility in foreign affairs, although its reputation
was already tarnished by the civil war in its own backyard, which it
seemed incapable of ending. But it had not yet suffered utter defeat and
indignity. Rather than risk Germany's breaking rank a week after Maas–
tricht, eleven foreign ministers gave in. The very next day, the British
press would call Genscher "the German bulldozer."
When Chancellor Kohl announced the EC Council of Ministers'
decision to delegates of the Christian Democratic Union Congress in
Dresden on December 17th, he was given an ovation. "This is a great
success for us and for Germany's politics," he added. Germany had deliv–
ered. It recognized Croatia and Slovenia just as it had promised it
would, before Christmas. For the sake of appearances, the decision was
made official on January 15th, 1992, when the other EC countries
joined. It should also be noted that the EC had taken great pains to
cloak its Yugoslav policies in respectability and legality. For this purpose,
