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ARTISAN REVIEW
tions to democracy in most post-Leninist countries: If the revolution is
to be liberal, then the rule of law should prevail over any rc;:vengeful
temptation. On the other hand, the proponents of de-Communization
ask, what is to be done in order to repair undeniable historical and
moral damages, wounds, and injuries? Recently, a
New York Times
edi–
torial addressed new revelations of guilt by the Argentine military for
thousands of
desaparecidos
during the "dirty war," and insisted that the
truce between the former tormentors and the former victims could not
be effective if it was based on shameful silence.
For all the former dictatorial regimes (leftist or rightist), the prob–
lems of memory and justice are inextricably linked: No liberal, open so–
ciety can be founded, and endure, on lies, cynicism, hypocrisy, suppressed
memories, and lack of repentance. Social peace (or reconciliation) can–
not be established on either vindictive furies or pseudo-compromises
between victims and victimizers. In all these countries, until 1989, a sys–
tem based on psychological and political repression functioned in accor–
dance with a utopian model of social development: If the persons who
experienced its hardships are to solve their moral and political dilemmas,
truth about the past should become a public good, fully accessible to all
citizens. This is of course difficult, but not impossible.
It
is also necessary
if the demons of the deposed tyrannies are to be finally exorcised. Ambi–
guities about the past, blurring distinctions and insinuating a kind of ro–
manticized vision of the
ancien regime,
have been proposed by former
Communists in their efforts to restore their image. A strategy meant to
keep the record straight and counter the historical revisionism so alluring
in times of political and moral crisis is thus extremely important. What
all these societies need is the recuperation of their traumatized memory,
coming to terms with their genuine past, overcoming the self-serving
mythologies of victimization.
The German treatment of the former GDR leaders and the Com–
munist legacies in general is in many respects unique. So far, several for–
mer Politburo members (the "unmagnificent seven"), including Egon
Krenz, Erich Honecker's short-lived successor as SED boss and chief
ideologue Kurt Hager, himself a former Spanish Civil War veteran, are
on trial for crimes against their fellow citizens. Because of their orders,
over six hundred East Germans who tried to escape to the West were
either shot dead or blown to bits at what the SED propaganda depicted
as the border between socialism and capitalism. Wishing to live under
capitalism, for Honecker, Krenz and their comrades, was a crime to be
most severely punished. Now, when they are brought to trial, there are
many who protest and say that sending these decrepit bureaucrats to jail
