HOW CAN GERMANY DEFUSE ITS NEIGHBORS' FEARS?
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Serbs and afraid of their powerful patrons in Belgrade and in the JNA.
The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had threatened that, if
Bosnia were to declare its sovereignty, the Serbs would secede from it.
In those days Germany presented itself as the patron saint not only of
Croatia and Slovenia but also of Bosnia. Both Kohl and Genscher had
shown sympathy and respect to Izetbegovic, whom they obviously
trusted.
It
is not quite clear whether they got Izetbegovic to agree to
the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, but he did visit Bonn
three days before Chancellor Kohl's fateful announcement. I covered
that visit for the paper I was writing for at the time, and Izetbegovic
had seemed a happy man at the press conference he gave after his audi–
ence with Kohl and Genscher. I have since heard that the last American
ambassador to Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman, in part blamed Bosnia's
fate on Izetbegovic. Zimmermann claims that Izetbegovic, unlike on
earlier occasions, did not express himself to Genscher forcefully enough
against Croatian recognition. Certainly, Zimmermann may know some–
thing I do not, and it is possible that Izetbegovic gave the Germans his
blessing, in exchange for something.
I do not know whether Germany has come to regret its strong-arm
tactics in recognizing Croatia, but since then it has defended that deci–
sion. I rather suspect that Genscher regretted it, given the fact that he
probably was forced to resign because of the way he mismanaged the
Yugoslav crisis. Germany came of age politically, but as soon as it did, it
stood accused. A terrible war was raging in Europe, and Germany had
helped bring it about. Since then, the German government has gone to
great lengths to deflect this criticism. The German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has even published a booklet that serves as an apologia, the tone
of which is without triumphalism and makes no mention of Kohl's
"great victory for Germany and its policies." The booklet states that the
EC decision was unilateral, not German but European.
It
rejects respon–
sibility for the Bosnian war, pointing out, accurately, that it was the
United States which led the drive for the recognition of Bosnia.
In June 1993 U .S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher accused
Germany of responsibility for the war in the former Yugoslavia. The
Western countries have not stopped their mutual recriminations and ac–
cusations ever since. Once war in Bosnia broke out, Germany for the
most part kept a low profile. Instead, it has worked to forge a new
strategic relationship with the U.S. and has done its best to secure, pro–
mote, and preserve the one triumph of American diplomacy in former
Yugoslavia, the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of
course, Germany cannot be held responsible for the prejudices of other
nations or ethnic groups. The Yugoslav peoples have destroyed their
