SUSAN HAACK
        
        
          
            399
          
        
        
          to counter-culturalism, as I shall say. The first shift was already accom–
        
        
          modated in my original fourfold distinction; accommodating the second
        
        
          shift gives us eight distinguishable positions; for example, besides philo–
        
        
          sophical multiculturalism,
        
        
          
            philosophical counter-culturalism.
          
        
        
          In principle,
        
        
          that is: in practice it is often far from clear which of these is being pro–
        
        
          posed.
        
        
          It
        
        
          is part of the particularists' strategy to blur the distinction be–
        
        
          tween their position and the pluralists', and it is part of the counter-cul–
        
        
          turalists' strategy to blur the differences between their use of "Western
        
        
          culture" and more ordinary uses. Bernstein's word is certainly a good
        
        
          one for this conceptually slippery situation.
        
        
          I mention social multiculturalism only to put it aside. It raises hard
        
        
          questions, even in the practically and morally more straightforward cases
        
        
          where social multiculturalism is not the result of conquest or a territorial
        
        
          decision imposed from outside, but of immigration: that Muslim girls in
        
        
          British schools should not be obliged to wear gym uniforms which are,
        
        
          by their standards, immodest, is easy enough, but it is very far from obvi–
        
        
          ous that the same tolerance should extend to, say, recognition of polyg–
        
        
          amous marriages, or to banning
        
        
          
            The Satanic Verses.
          
        
        
          But such social and
        
        
          political questions fall outside the scope of this essay.
        
        
          The claim of pluralistic educational multiculturalism is true. It
        
        
          
            is
          
        
        
          de–
        
        
          sirable for people to know about other cultures than their own. (As I
        
        
          write this sentence, though, newly struck by that deceptively straightfor–
        
        
          ward-sounding phrase, "their own," I am reminded of Dewey's observa–
        
        
          tion that "the typical American is himself . . . international and interra–
        
        
          cial in his makeup .") Pluralistic educational multiculturalism is desirable ,
        
        
          but it is not easily achieved - a more-than-superficial knowledge of an–
        
        
          other culture is likely to require some fluency in another language; and it
        
        
          is not easily combined with ensuring that students acquire the other
        
        
          knowledge and skills they will need. Still, awareness that others do things
        
        
          differently and take different beliefs for granted helps one to discriminate
        
        
          the conventional from the non- conventional in one's own practice and
        
        
          thinking, to avoid the "rightly are they called 'pigs' " syndrome. And
        
        
          yes, knowledge of the customs of minority communities within a
        
        
          multicultural society can, surely, contribute to the accomplishment of a
        
        
          mutually tolerable, or, with good luck and good will, a mutually en–
        
        
          riching,
        
        
          
            modus vivendi.
          
        
        
          The claim of particularistic educational multiculturalism is false, and
        
        
          for some of the same reasons that pluralistic educational multiculturalism
        
        
          is true (and, for some of the same reasons that pluralistic educational
        
        
          multiculturalism is likely to contribute to mutual tolerance, particularistic
        
        
          educational multiculturalism runs the risk of contributing to mutual
        
        
          
            in-