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encouraging the acceptance of theories which are not well-supported by
evidence. (One way, if there is diversity of preconceptions within science,
is competition between prejudice and counterprejudice. But "diversity"
here emphatica ll y docs not mean "proportional representation of
women, blacks, Jews ... " - an interpretation which rests on the assump–
tion that all women, or all blacks, and so on, think alike; nor "equal
representation for any and all ideas and approaches" - an interpretation
which ignores the need for mechanisms, even if they are inevitably imper–
fect mechanisms, to exclude the crank, the crackpot, and the long-dis–
credited idea.) Feminist criticism of sexist science, like studies of the disas–
ters of Nazi or Soviet science, can be a useful resource in this sub- sub–
task of the "conduct of inquiry" project. But this is a role that requires
the conception of theories as better or worse as supported by the evi–
dence, and the distinction of evidential and nonevidential considerations,
traditionally investigated in the "criteria of justification" project; not a
role
that allows us to abandon or requires us radically to revise the con–
cepts of evidence or truth or reality.
I have argued that there is no such connection between feminism
and epistemology as the rubric "feminist epistemology" requires.
I
have
not denied that some themes presented under that rubric are true; and
I
have granted that some feminist criticisms of sexist science seem well–
founded and have a bona fide epistemological role, albeit a rather mod–
est one. So why, you may ask, do
I
make all this fuss about the label?
Well, since the idea that there is an epistemology properly called
"feminist" rests on false presuppositions, the label is at best sloppy. But
there is more at stake than dislike of sloppiness; more than offense at the
implication that those of us who don't think it appropriate to describe
our epistemological work as "feminist" don't care about justice for
women; more than unease at sweeping generalizations about women and
embarrassment at the suggestion that women have special epistemological
insight. What is most troubling is that the label is designed to convey the
idea that inquiry shou ld be politicized. And that is not on ly mistaken,
but dangerously so.
It is dangerously mistaken from an epistemological point of view,
because the presupposition on which it rests - that genu ine, disinterested
inquiry is impossible - is, in Bacon's shrewd phrase, a "factitious despair"
which will, indeed , "cut the sinews and spur of industry." Serious intel–
lectual work is hard, painful, frustrating; suggesting that it is legitimate
to succumb to the temptation
to
cut corners can only block the way of
mqUiry.
I would say that inquiry really is best advanced by people with a
genuine desire to find out how things are, who will be more persistent,
less dogmatic, and more candid than sham reasoners seeking on ly to
