EUGENE GOODHEART
553
contingent, the critic who "traditionally" had derived his confidence
from a knowledge of the literary tradition, experience, taste, and intel–
lectual capacity discovers or is told that his or her judgments are without
foundation. The field is then left to politics, or to a certain kind of pol–
itics that determines what stays in, stays out, goes in, goes out. (The po–
litical or ideological category has yet to receive the kind of demysti£Ying
scrutiny to which the aesthetic category has been treated.) The revision
of the canon does not necessarily entail exclusion: it may mean a new
"understanding" motivated by suspicion of concealed motives of domi–
nation and by a passion for demystification. It discovers sexism in
Rabelais, colonialism in Shakespeare, complicity with patriarchy in Jane
Austen. The politically motivated critic whose view of texts is complex
and literary will not reduce the meanings of Rabelais, Shakespeare, and
Austen to sexism, colonialism, and patriarchy respectively. But the new
ideological focus tends to produce a code of political correctness once
one has decided
to
take this route. The temptation is strong to judge
texts according to contemporary standards of decency. Even if one
wishes to accept these standards, the burden of proof that Shakespeare is
not colonialist or that his colonialist message may not be the most in–
teresting thing about him becomes very heavy. Assuming the worst about
sexism, colonialism, and patriarchy, such criticism tends to freeze all
pleasure in the playfulness, irreverence, and irresponsibility of the imagi–
nation. It becomes blind and deaf to the possible truth in ideas and atti–
tudes that do not satisfy contemporary standards of decency. "Political
correctness" is hostile to the imagination.
Earlier I suggested that political correctness does not necessarily fol–
low from a leftist politics. The content of a political position may be
distinguished from an attitude taken toward it. One may advocate multi–
culturalism without dogmatic arrogance. If it simply meant a respect for
cultural diversity, much of the controversy would be unintelligible. The
debate concerns how multiculturalism is construed. Thus Diane Ravitch
celebrates "the pluralistic nature of American culture" and "the new his–
tory ... [which] demands an unflinching examination of racism and
discrimination in our history." She accepts the raised "tempers" and
"controversies" that accompany changes in historical perspectives, for we
are now provided with "a more interesting and accurate account of
American history." But she sets herself against "a new, particularistic mul–
ticulturalism" that "insist[s] that no common culture is possible or desir–
able." It should be noted that a particularist view does not necessarily
represent the interests and desires of a particular group. There is the po–
litical question of who decides the identity of the group and its desires
and interests.
Cultural particularism or separatism is a somewhat misleading phrase,
