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version, the argument is a
non sequitur.
Even if it were true that scientists
are never entirely without prejudice, even if it were impossible that they
should entirely put their prejudices out of sight when judging the evi–
dence for a theory, it doesn't follow that it is proper to allow prejudice
to determine theory choice. (No doubt it is impossible to make science
perfect; it doesn't follow that we shouldn't try to make it better.)
The failure of these arguments is symptomatic of the false presuppo–
sition on which the second attempt to connect feminism and epistemol–
ogy depends: that, since the old romantic picture is not defensible, there
is no option but the new cynicism. These are not the only options; the
truth, as so often, lies between the extremes. The old romanticism over–
stresses the virtues, the new cynicism the vices, of science; the old roman–
ticism focuses too exclusively on the logical, the new cynicism too ex–
clusively on the sociological, factors that an adequate philosophy of sci–
ence should combine. Science is neither sacred nor a confidence trick.
It
has been the most successful of human cognitive endeavors, but it is
thoroughly fallible and imperfect - and, in particular, like all human
cognitive endeavor, it is susceptible to fad and fashion, partiality and
politics.
If my diagnosis is correct, though it is not inevitable that all the
themes offered under the rubric "feminist epistemology" are false, it is in–
evitable that only those themes can be true which fail in their cynical in–
tent. It is true, for example, that inquirers are profoundly and pervasively
dependent on each other; but it does not follow that reality is however
some epistemic community determines it to be. It is true that sometimes
scientists may perceive relevant evidence as relevant only when persuaded,
perhaps by political pressure, out of previous prejudices; but it does not
follow that what evidence is relevant is not an objective matter. The
misconception that it does, however, is so ubiquitous that it deserves a
name. I call it "the 'passes for' fallacy," since it argues from the true
premise that what passes for evidence, known fact, reality, and so forth,
often is no such thing, to the false conclusion that the ideas of evidence,
fact, reality, truth are humbug.
Once the "passes for" fallacy is seen as such, the epistemological sig–
nificance of feminist criticisms of sexism in scientific theorizing is seen to
be, though real enough, undramatic and by no means revolutionary. One
traditional project of epistemology is to give rules, or, better, guidelines,
for the conduct of inquiry; another is to articulate criteria of evidence or
justification. One sub- task of the "conduct of inquiry" project is
to
fig–
ure out what environments are supportive of, and what hostile to, suc–
cessful inquiry. One sub-task of this sub-task is to figure out how to
minimize the effect of unquestioned and unjustifiable preconceptions in
