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PARTISAN REVIEW
Some inkling of what I mean by saying we make worlds may
begin to glimmer here; we make versions, and true versions make
worlds. This calls for further explanation on more than one score .
How can we be said to make worlds by making versions , when mak–
ing a true description of a chair, for example, falls far short of mak–
ing a chair? And while we make versions, and we hope some true
versions, we can hardly make versions true . Moreover , if there is no
independent world to match a version against, what constitutes truth
and what are the tests for it?
How to Make Things with Words
2
That we can make the stars dance , as Galileo and Bruno made
the earth move and the sun stop, not by physical force but by verbal
invention , is plain enough . That we by like means also make things
what they are in respects other than motion has now begun to be
clear. From here a short step leads to the conclusion that we make
the things themselves. But that, on the face of it, seems silly.
Downright refutations are ready at hand in the form of challenges to
produce forthwith, by means of a potent description , an extra
planet, a chair to sit in, or a tender beefsteak . Inevitable failure is
taken to prove the point.
But I have not said that we can make a steak or a chair or a
world at will and as we like by making a version. Only if true does
description make things; and making a true version can be hard
work. But isn't that begging the question? Doesn't that amount to
saying that versions can make only what is already there? And how
can that properly be said to be making at all?
If
versions can make
neither what is nor what is not already there, that seems a closed
case against their making anything at all.
Yet I am not ready to give up; 'being already there' needs fur–
ther examination, and finding what is already there may turn out to
be very much a matter of making.
I sit in a cluttered waiting room, unaware of any stereo system .
Gradually I make out two speakers built into the bookcase, a
2. With apologies to
J.
L.
Austin , who did not explicitly include making things in
what we do with words.
