NELSON GOODMAN
279
Ontology Evanescent
Or have we gone too far too fast? May the conflicts we en–
counter among truths turn out on closer examination to amount less
to genuine differences in what is said than to differences in manner
of saying? Rather than disagreements on objective fact, are these
merely superficial differences, chargeable to the varying perspectives
and languages of our versions, with the real world to be sought be–
neath such surface disturbances?
Consider again, for example, the true statements that the earth
is at rest, that it revolves around the sun, that it dances a jig, and so
on . The suggestion is that the conflicts between these have no more
to do with the earth, sun, or other heavenly bodies than do the dif–
ferent orders in which these objects may be described, but arise from
the differing biases of the several versions; and that statements con–
cerning the direction, speed, and acceleration of motion are different
ways of describing the neutral facts of variation in distance between
objects at different times.
If
all features responsible for disagree–
ments among versions are thus dismissed as artificial, truths will no
longer conflict in a way that calls for different worlds.
But once we recognize that some supposed features of the world
derive from - are made and imposed by - versions, 'the world' rap–
idly evaporates. For there is no version-independent feature, no true
version compatible with all true versions. Our so-called neutral ver–
sion of motion is as prejudiced as any other; for if direction and
speed and acceleration are relative to observer and frame of refer–
ence, so also is distance between objects. And, as I shall argue
below, the objects themselves and the time and space they occupy
are version-dependent. No organization into units is unique or man–
datory, nor is there any featureless raw material underlying different
organizations. Any raw stuff is as much the creature of a version as
is what is made out of that stuff.
Yet if all features of a world are creatures of a version, are
generated and imposed by the version, what can they be imposed
upon? The question is pertinent but slightly awry. The world of a
true version is a construct; the features are not conferred upon
something independent of the version but combined with one an–
other to make the world of that version. The world is not the version
itself; the version may have features - such as being in English or
consisting of words - that its world does not. But the world depends
upon the version .
