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inclusive whole. By assigning conflicting versions to different worlds,
we preclude composition of these totalities into one. Whatever we
may mean by saying that the motion of the Earth, or of different
earths, differs in different worlds, we rule out any more comprehen–
sive whole comprised of these. For a totality cannot be partial; a
world cannot be a piece of something bigger.
So if there is any world, there are many, and if many, none.
And if none, what becomes of truth and the relationship of a version
to what it describes? Parmenides ran into this trouble long ago; be–
cause truths conflict, we cannot describe the world. Even when he
said
"It
is" he went too far.
"It
is" gives way to "They are"; and "They
are" to "None is". Monism, pluralism, nihilism coalesce.
Part of the trouble comes, as in the Kantian antinomies, from
stretching some terms or notions beyond their reach. So long as we
keep within a version, "world" or "totality" is clear enough, but when
we consider conflicting true versions and their several worlds, para–
dox enters. This sometimes leads to utter resignation, sometimes to
an irresponsible relativism that takes all statements as equally true.
Neither attitude is very productive. More serviceable is a policy
common in daily life and impressively endorsed by modern science:
namely, judicious vacillation. After all, we shift point of view and
frame of reference for motion frequently from sun to earth to train to
plane, and so on. The physicist flits back and forth between a world
of waves and a world of particles as suits his purpose. We usually
think and work within one world-version at a time - hence Hilary
Putnam's term "internal realism"l- but we shift from one to another
often. When we undertake to relate different versions, we introduce
multiple worlds. When that becomes awkward, we drop the worlds
for the time being and consider only the versions. We are monists,
pluralists, or nihilists not quite as the wind blows but as befits the
context.
According to one variety of solipsism, only I exist but this holds
for each of the many people in the world. Somewhat analogously,
one might say that there is only one world but this holds for each of
the many worlds. In both cases the equivocation is stark - yet per–
haps negotiable.
1.
See, for example, his
Meaning and the Moral Sciences
(London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 123-140.
