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the world of truth . No doubt the litera ry intell ec tu al has good reason
to defe nd the power of the creati ve mind . But the "soc iological
imagina tion" gene ra ll y confines itself to the interaction of the self
with othe rs as the ultima te da tum o f experie nce a nd truth . We as k
for a theo ry o f a utho ri ty a nd we a re give n a conception of huma n
nature tha t canno t think about a uthority as a n object o f though t.
Senne tt would have us rej ec t fo rms of a uthority such as
paterna lism becau se they a re cha racteri zed by "fa lse love." Indeed ,
love seems to be Se nne tt's criterion o f genuine a uthority . But he
offers no ex pla na ti on of true love, no criteri a for recogni zing it or for
distingui shing it from fa lse beliefs, a nd thus offe rs us no crite ri on for
understa nding a nd accepting proper express ions o f a uthority. J es us
had a uthority, but so did Vince Lombardi , which sugges ts tha t
sentimen ts o f leg itimacy may sp ring from ha te as well as love. A
reporter once as ked a G ree nbay Packer if hi s coach were a "rac ist. "
"No," replied the black linema n . "H e ha tes us a ll. "
Bo th Vince Lomba rdi a nd Niccolo M ac hi avelli knew the
meaning of a utho ri ty as the capac ity not onl y to ge t one's vi ews
acce pted but
to
have one's orders obeyed , a nd the coach mi ght agree
with the philosopher tha t "great men call it a di sgrace to lose ."
In
thi s
res pec t a utho rity derives from power a nd will , insofa r as it is
bes towed upon those who triumph ove r obstacles to emerge
victorious, a nd those who triumph a re not
to
tru st ma n , unless such
tru st is based upon fear ra ther tha n love.
T here a re ma ny dime nsions to what
J
.G.A . Pocock has call ed
"the M achi avellia n M oment" in Wes te rn political thought , tha t
turning po int
in
intell ec tu al hi sto ry when a n ea rl y form o f scientific
"realism" replaced traditi ona l C hri stia n mo ra lism in the conduct of
sta tecra ft. The ge niu s of M achi avelli's wi sdom , as Isa ia h Be rlin has
noted, lies no t in hi s di scove rin g the reality of power but in hi s
recogni zing as a n "in solubl e dil emma" tha t there a re no real a nswers
to bas ic problem s a nd thu s "those who wi shed to survive had to
tolera te error. " "This," Be rlin obse rves, "is the dagger o f whi ch
Meinecke speaks, with which M achiavelli inflicted the wound tha t
has neve r healed. " One casua l.ty o f M achi avelli's medita ti ons on
powe r a nd a uthority was truth , the idea tha t the ultima te na ture of
reality could be grasped in order to a rri ve a t objec ti ve ly valid
solutions to problems of mo ra l conduct; the second casua lty was
love, the idea tha t ma n has the mora l po tenti al for res ponding to
demonstra ted principles o f goodness tha t may even go against hi s
sel f-interes ts. Ever since M achiavelli purged C hri sti a n ethics from
