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experience is not a nswerable to objective ideas . Both under tood
authority as a rela tion of subo rdina tion to domina tion , whe ther tha t
of the superego to an ideali zed pa renta l image or that of a follower to
the cha ri sma tic leader. Simila rl y, Se nnett believes tha t "the
conditions of power will la rgely determine wha t the subj ec ts see a nd
feel. " We err in refu sin g to acknowledge tha t a uthority answers real
needs in ma n's socia l na ture. One need is legitimacy. "The mos t
importa nt gene ra l feature of Weber's approach is tha t he ide ntifies
authority with legitimacy. People will no t obey, he believes, those
they think a re ill egitima te . The conseque nce, to Weber , is tha t we
can alway tell whe n a sense of a uthority ex ists in a society; it is
when people volunta ril y obey their rule rs ."
Can we "always tell" whe n legitima te a uthority exi sts merely by
obse rving deeds of volunta ry obedi ence? C a n we va lidly infer from
an ac t of submi ss ion tha t those who submit know the bas is on which
they a re ac ting? Eve n vo lunta ry submi ss ion may not logicall y imply
legitimacy if those who submit have not the fa intes t noti on of wha t
legitima te, ri ghtful a uthority is o r wha t it should be. Weber's
a nalys is of legitimacy contributed much to socia l scie nce, but it
falters be fo re the uremberg ra llies a nd the J onesv ille massac re.
"The dilemma of a utho rity in our time," writes Sennett , "the
peculi a r fe a r it inspires, is tha t
weJeel attracted to strong figures we do not
believe to be legitimate."
The identifica ti on of the weak with the strong is
scarcely "the dil emma of a uthority in our time." Thi s was true of
triba l wa rrior cultures a t the d awn of human hi story. Class ical
political philosophers from M achi a velli
to
H obbes recogni zed that
fear a nd insecurity create obedi ence to the symbols of force and
strength . Why ma n consents to hi s own domination by others is a
perplex ing issue, but eve n if it involves ma n's volunta ry subju ga tion
to something other tha n power a nd coe rcion we would still be ha rd
pres ed to regard such behav ior as legitima te. M a rx, of course,
termed it a species of "fa lse consciousness," a nd Antonio Gramsci
and Thorstein Veblen showed us tha t wha t a ppea red to be false was
ac tua ll y real in ofa r a the mas es of men willingly submit to the
"hegemonic" a uthority of the ruling class a nd "emula te" its values.
The radical theo ri st wa nts ma n to cas t off these emotiona l cha ins,
but hi s sentimenta l prefe rence does not constitute a philosophy
based on principle . One mi ght compare, fo r example, the
contempora ry socia l psychologist with the eighteenth- century
Enli ghtenment philosopher on the issue of legitima te a uthority.
Where the fo rme r sees the rela ti on to a uthority as pa rt of ma n's
