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socia l na ture, the la tter looks to the laws o f' na ture a nd God. Thus in
its Ameri can ve rsion the doc trine o f "natura l ri ghts" gra nted to man
not onl y cla ims to property a nd liberty but the "duty" to preserve his
freed om a nd not to a li ena te hi s ri ghts. T he dilemma o f social
phil osophy in our time seems to have less to do with the obv ious fact
tha t people will fl ee from freedom into the a rms of a uthority than
with the less obvious fact tha t the mode rn intell ec tua l cannot
propose a reason why they should no t. We suffer from too much
socio logy.
Thus Se nnett trea ts a uthority as a consta nt process o f inter–
pret ing powe r on the pa rt o f the subj ec ts who expe rie nce it.
"Authori ty ... is itself inherentl y a n act of imagina ti on. " R educing
authority to emotions a nd pe rceptions, he a ttempts to go beyond
Freud a nd Weber a nd beyond the Fra nkfurt school by explorin g the
"mi ss ing dimension : the ac tu al g ive a nd ta ke between the strong and
the weak." Sennett seeks the legitima ti on of a uthority through
cha nges in the rol es o f those who exe rcise a uthority a nd tho e who
acqui esce to it. Yet tra nsformin g the private rela ti ons o f employees
a nd workers, o f pa rents a nd children , or of teachers a nd students ,
into mutu all y sha red power a nd res ponsibility does little to es ta blish
the grounds for political a uthority based on obj ec tive sta nda rds of
the public good. This concept o f a uthority a ll ows for a coll ec ti vity of
inte racting minds tha t a nswe r to nothing beyond the ir own
perceptions . Pushed to its logical conclusion , thi s concept would
repl ace theo ry with the ra py. Turning a uthority over to the people
may enable them to enj oy the exe rcise of power , but it does not
es ta blish a rela ti on to legitima te a uthority . Fo r the traditi onal
emphas is on comma nds a nd obli gati ons, socia l psychology
substitutes emoti ona l self-fulfillme nt , ignoring Thomas Huxl ey's
wa rning that "a ma n's worst diffi c ulties begin when he is a ble to do as
he likes."
The sociological interpreta ti on of authority tends to become a
subj ec t without a n obj ect , providing us with a n account o f wha t we
feel ra ther tha n a n evalua tion of wha t we know . It es pecially
obscures the di stincti on be tween the experience of everyday power
rela ti ons a nd knowl edge a nd understa nding of genuine a uthority .
Insofa r as social reality consists in priva te in te rac tions, the locus of
a uthority does not lie either in public in stituti ons (government , law ,
etc.) tha t mi ght enge nde r obedi e nce, or in ideas (v irtue, justice, etc.)
tha t mi ght compel the mind's assent. To locate authority in the
"ima gina tion" is not so much to rende r it unreal as to remove it from
