EURO-COMMUNISM
15
Italy, and between two interpretations of the possibilities of the Party
in the present spectrum of Italian political forces. For the moment,
the so-call ed Right line has won, but there are some indi ca tions that
this might not go on forever.
The United States policy is more supple or subtle at the moment
than under Kissinger or under previous administrations. The official
policy declaration is that the election of Western European govern–
ments is a matter for the Wes tern Europeans, but that we prefer that
parties with "our values" should be elected. I myself fail to see why
my own values are more refl ected by Fanfani the leader of the Italian
Right, than they are by Berlinguer. For the moment the United
States is playing a waiting game. It has indicated that it won't be
thrill ed by a union of the Left government in France, or by the entry
of the Italian Communists into power. It has also indica ted that for
the moment no strenuous and immediate measures will be taken
against them.
This is somewhat of an improvement on a policy which made us
hostages, as in other parts of the world, of the Right. At the same
time, it conceivably gives us chances to open up a "dialogue" with
important sectors, particularly in southern Europe, of the society
who have simply been out of contact with theUnited States, particu–
larly in the Union movement, and large sectors of the intelligentsia.
On the other hand the policy keeps open some alternatives. Do the
Euro-Communist parties, as varied as they are, and with the French
Party in particular in a sta te of such rupture from the Socialists that
it is unlikely now to enter government in the foreseeable future,
present a danger to Western European democracy? And if they do
present a danger, should we not come to the aid of the forces
opposing th em? The answer to that question is tha t different people
will make different es tima tes of the risks. La rge sectors of European
opinion, not alone in these parties or on the Left , do not necessarily
see these parties as presenting a danger to European democracy, and
one could make a case for the position that an attempt to block
European politics by saying that the European Communists can on
no 'account enter government opens up possibilities not alone of
blockage and polarization but, at least for Ital y, the possibility of a
devastating civil war with unforeseen consequences.
It
seems to me tha t the movement of change in some of these
parties can in fact be en couraged, facilitated , or at leas t treated with a
certain amount of long-term comprehension. This wou ld probably
entail accepting for th e moment cross-class alliances and alterations
