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CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN
directly, from over the border, and all that is necessary is to help the
brave and staunchly anti-communist people of wherever-it-is to defend
themselves against these evil and alien incursions. Thus, Diana Trilling
in reply to your questionnaire thinks "that there were other better
ways to help the South Vietnamese resist communist aggression-with
money, technical assistance, arms--without our proclaiming ourselves,
as we have, the far-reaching nation of the sword, and without this overt
control of a regime of our choice." But the point is that many of "the
South Vietnamese" did not wish to resist what Mrs. Trilling calls "Com–
munist aggression"; many of them were in fact willing to fight side by
side with Communists, and under Communist leadership, against those
whom Mrs. Trilling thinks of as being
the
South Vietnamese, who were
indeed most liberally supplied by the American authorities with those
"better ways . . . money, technical assistance, arms," on which she
thinks it sufficient to rely. The American authorities on the spot, how–
ever, came to a different conclusion,
viz.
that
their
South Vietnamese,
although so aided, were losing and would have to be stiffened by
American troops. There followed the steady rise in the American and
allied forces committed, combined with the North Vietnamese involve–
ment on the other side. It remains true that the only non-Vietnamese
fighting in Vietnam are the Americans and their allies, and that they
are doing so because, left to itself, Vietnam would quickly become re–
united under a Communist form of Government. The American authori–
ties would no doubt, like Mrs. Trilling, have preferred-as they do else–
where-a covert to an overt control. But the problem was that here
covert control and "the better ways" were not enough.
If
indeed it was
unthinkable that "Vietnam should go Communist," then American
military force and overt control had to be applied. And
if
the same
problem arises in other areas, the same solution follows, on the same
principle.
But why should it be unthinkable? On moral grounds? Is Saigon
morally superior to Hanoi, the regime of Marshal Ky to that of Ho
Chi Minh? Most reports suggest the contrary. Or on political grounds
-that a Communist victory would bring an extension of the power of
China? But there is no serious evidence to suggest that it would. Those
who are now most sure that the victory of the NLF would extend the
power of China were equally sure that the Chinese Revolution would
extend the power of Russia. In
The China Story-which
ran through
four editions in 1951-Freda Utley wrote:
Through his trusted henchman, Marshal Malinovsky, Stalin
appointed Lin Piao as commander of the Chinese Communist
armies which were equipped and trained by Russia. Once as-
