552
DAVID
T.
BAZELON
Our dangers do not lie primarily in the size of the Soviet
economy or its overall rate of growth. Our dangers lie in a
particular allocation of Soviet resources ; in particular Soviet
policies; in the way we Americans now conceive of our
problems on the world scene; and, consequently, in the way
we allocate our resources, human and material. . . . The pro–
fessional Soviet literature on 'catching up' with the United
States suggests the objective in the next decade is to equal
or surpass American production in certain key sectors related
to military potential (e.g., steel) rather than to exceed Ameri–
can levels of GNP. . .
The simple significance of the Sputnik episode was that in utter
disregard of our statistical-to-1975 advantage in production, the Soviets
outdistanced us decisively in the most advanced scientific-industrial
area. They accomplished this with half our GNP-by means of superior
organization and the concentration of resources to an end. There is
no reason why they cannot do this again. Russia is still a poor country
compared to us, but they are increasingly able to surpass us in crucial
areas. It should be recalled that they accomplished the same result be–
fore Sputnik by equalling our armament on half our GNP. So what–
ever theories we may hold about the superiority of market decisions
over bureaucratic ukase, we must admit the facts in front of us-that
not all bureaucratic decisions are wrong or incompetent.
We used to think of our productive capacity-whether used, un–
used or misused-as the source of our great power. With a little time
for conversion, GM will produce thousands of tanks, Ford will fiII
tne air with thousands of American aircraft, the steel mills will turn
out the steel for millions of tons of shipping, and so on. Yes, but
there won't be any time, this time. Or more properly, the time is now–
and the products are not tanks, planes, and ships.
The products are
t>verything we can use to make ourselves superior to the Russians, and
everything the world can use to be induced to follow us instead of them.
Apart from maintaining the military stand-off, that is all that our
superior industrial capacity can mean in the new context.
For example, it is not enough that we
could
create a scientific
establishment equal or superior to the Russians. They have it and we
don't. There is only one cure for that- create it. Not tanks and planes,
but schools. Not Liberty ships, but laboratories. Otherwise, we lose the
war-just as surely as we would have lost the war against Germany
and Japan if we had not stopped making cars and refrigerators and
started producing war material. (And the corporations dragged their
feet at the beginning of that war, too.)
