546
DAVID
T.
BAZELON
Moreover, it is too early for unilateral surrender on either side, and
probably inadvisable in any event. What would be surrendered would
be the power and the right to participate in the governing and de–
veloping of the planet. Neither side is really capable of doing this
alone; and to encourage a dictatorship of the world by an incompetent
power seems eminently to be avoided. So also is a nuclear holocaust.
In the present balance of impossibilities, there has been brought
into effect an implied anti-suicide pact. Delicate and tentative, this
is nevertheless the true power-foundation of the coming world govern–
ment. It is fundamentally an alliance between Russia and the United
States; it is obviously the most important alliance in world politics;
and like all alliances, it is inevitably directed against non-parties. Thus
the nature of war has been turned inside out, so that it now
begins
with
an agreement between the warring parties, and is carried forward on
two complementary fronts: in any and all non-military areas; and by
strengthening and extending the agreement which marked the onset
of hostilities. In other words, modem war consists entirely of a long,
hard process of
phased sUl/"Tender.
So disarmament, for example, is
not properly conceived as an end to the war, but rather as a par–
ticular-and very important-theatre of combat. Success in this theatre
would mean a significant deepening of the war-agreement, achieve–
ment of further substantial surrender, and of course an increased as–
sertion of the power of the alliance against non-parties.
All of which adds up to "negotiation"-difficult, complex, unend–
ing. We must negotiate, or accept the impossible alternatives of nuclear
war or unilateral surrender. And the basis of negotiation-all negotia–
tion, any negotiation-is
the definition of reality in terms of power or
commitment,
with an implied understanding that each party to the
negotiation will face up to agreed-upon reality. Before we get to the
question of power, what commitment do we share with the Russians?
Let's be safe and assume none, until proven-except the commitment
to avoid self-destruction, because that is already proven. For commit–
ment, read morality-which is significant in conflict-situations in the
real world only to the extent that it is actually shared. And one is
never sure. All morality requires taking a chance. To take a chance is
to take a chance, and no cheap satisfactions of indignation or righteous
superiority are to be contemplated. So much for shared commitment as
a basis for negotiation: it is the
end
of the process, not its beginning.
Now power. Power as a basis of negotiation refers necessarily to
existing power. Most frequently, parties cannot negotiate about future
power; what they ordinarily do is wait until the future has arrived,
