PO LITICS OF 1970
431
advanced for comparisons with other regions to be meaningful. A re–
cent economic forecast suggests that
if
the long-term rate of growth
in the United States since 1880 is maintained in future, then by 1975
the gross national product will exceed $725 billion, compared with
$415 billion in 1956, which would mean that by 1975 the disposable
income of the average family (after taxes) would be in excess of $7,000,
as against some $5,300 at present. (Report published by the Committee
for Economic Development, February 1958.) Such forecasts bear no
relation to the problems of the undeveloped countries, i.e., those that
have not yet made the transition to an industrial economy. Not only is
the gap between advanced and backward countries, between the rich
and the poor, steadily widening, but their affairs are on altogether dif–
ferent levels. In the backward countries the question is not how to
raise consumption standards, but how to make the initial investment
that will spark the process of self-sustaining advance across the threshold
of stagnation and growing misery. And the overriding political problem
is whether this can be done democratically; as to which a certain de–
gree of scepticism is legitimate. To put it simply: can peasant electorates
be expected to support policies which boil down to financing the growth
of industry, while the income of all other groups of society is either
artificially held down or at any rate not substantially increased? And
if the electorates fail to sanction such policies, can some form of dic–
tatorship be avoided? And given the choice between the various brands
of authoritarianism, are not the Communists remarkably well placed
to win this particular race?
There is no definite answer to such questions, but it is in these
terms, more or less, that the issue presents itself to the political and
intellectual elites in the backward countries, which is another way of
saying that the politics of 1970 are going to be significantly different
from those of the liberal era. In retrospect it is clear now that since
1914 the liberal experiment has shown signs of flagging outside the
Western world (properly so called) -the world of Western Europe and
North America. Whether the march can be resumed, and if so under
what banner and in what sort of symbiosis with democratic forms of
socialism, no one can say. It is unwise to encourage optimism on this
score. Weare on the defensive, and likely to stay there for a long time
to come, no matter how many summit conferences are held, or how many
steps are taken to improve the apparatus of policy and propaganda.
What is called the Cold War is essentially a struggle for political control
over the uncommitted areas of the world. In this struggle, the Western
camp and the Sino-Soviet bloc will continue to deploy a variety of tech-
