KNOWLEDGE AND "KNOWLEDGE"
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that atoms are tenuous." Quantitative scientific determinations may
ignore qualitative experiences, but they cannot abolish them, since
they take their point of departure from them. Regardless of what
the organizing categories of a science are, when its conclusions are
applied, or when its rules of operational procedure are stated, they
must take note of the catalogue of common things, their varying
structures, functions and locations.
It
is sometimes said that common sense inquiry operates with
concepts that are direct transcripts of things and their qualities, while
science uses theoretical constructs that are at best indirectly related
to the elements of experience. This statement seems to me to be in–
adequate, on two counts. First,
it
overlooks the differing degrees of
complexity among the constructs of the different sciences. These
range from the relatively simple ones of biology and economics, which
are not far removed from the abstractions of ordinary discourse, to
the theoretical constructs of modern physics, which are far beyond
description in such ordinary terms. Secondly, this distinction does not
do justice to the extent to which common sense or ordinary discourse
is shot through with theoretical constructs. A man need not be a
scientist to talk about the
average
age of
his
children or the
potential
power of his automobile, the
reliability
of his neighbor's
memory,
the
honor
of his country. Although these instances involve only
simple theoretical constructs, they are still constructs. This is not to
deny the enormous difference between the language of common sense
inquiry and that of science; but the difference is not a principled
one, if only because the gradual changes in common sense language
reflect the influence of scientific theory and discovery. Ordinary
language in its historical growth usually shows the influence of the
science of an earlier generation.
There are certain objections that must
be
dealt with by anyone
who asserts that there is no knowledge except scientific knowledge.
(1) Is not
this
view self-refuting? There is no science in which such
an assertion is warranted, as a piece of knowledge. And if it is held
to be knowledge nonetheless, is it not an instance of purely philo–
sophical knowledge? (2)
If
there
is
no knowledge but scientific
knowledge, are we not ruling out
a priori
the existence of super–
natural entities and creatures, playing at being God at the very
