KNOWLEDGE AND "KNOWLEDGE"
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is
more empirical evidence, although far from convincing, for the
existence of ghosts than of angels, for there are more people who
claim to have seen, heard, spoken to and even photographed ghosts
than angels. Among the mystifying attributes of ghosts that stand
in the way of belief in their existence is their strong predilection for
English domiciles.)
(c) We cannot know if we are only guessing.
If,
ignorant of
what horses are running or of their past perfonnances, I guess the
winner, or if in a random selection or toss I guess the number or
card that comes up, I cannot claim to have knowledge. Indeed, it
is
not likely that we would speak of "a game of chance" if any of
the participants had knowledge of how things would turn out.
If,
however, I keep on guessing and my guesses turn out always or
almost always to be right, others will in time be convinced that I
have knowledge. At a certain point my success in guessing in itself
constitutes a good reason for keeping on guessing in the manner
that has proved successful.
Unless we have good reason for a judgment, or are in possession
of evidence that warrants giving one particular answer rather than
another,
it
is arbitrary to maintain that we have knowledge of any
kind. Where we do not know, we can claim that our belief rests on
faith. I shall use the tenn "faith" in the sense of belief that
is
not
justified by evidence; knowledge, on the other hand, is belief that
is
so justified. To assert that knowledge, as well as belief, rests on
faith
is
either to use the tenn "faith" in some special way or not
to talk sense. The notion of knowledge as belief based on adequate
evidence leaves the tenn "evidence" undefined, but for our purposes
it will suffice to say that where knowledge of fact
is
claimed, evidence
must rest directly or indirectly upon judgments gained by observa–
tion and upon such other judgments as may legitimately, or logically,
be inferred from them.
The chief issues with which I am here concerned can be brought
into focus by stating briefly a position defended by both Dewey
and Russell, despite their not inconsiderable differences, to wit:
All
knowledge that men have is scientific knowledge.
This sounds very dogmatic, but is really an expression of in–
tellectual humility that seeks to avoid unlimited credulity. It does
not doubt that we possess scientific knowledge but leaves open the
