KNOWLEDGE AND "KNOWLEDGE"
231
We may put the matter another way. According to the position
we are examining, reflection on any finite thing encountered in ex–
perience reveals that its existence "implies" the existence of an ab–
solutely necessary being. But the existence of no finite thing
is
itself
absolutely necessary. Nonetheless it would stilI be true to
say
that
no matter what particular finite thing existed, no matter how radi–
cally it differed from what is now observable, reflection on it would
reveal that its existence "implies" the existence of an absolutely nec–
essary being. No matter what the contingent facts may
be,
they are
said to "imply" not merely a hypothetical but a categorical necessity.
An
empirical argument starts from contingent premises and results
in
probable conclusions. A purely rational argument starts from a
necessary premise of logic or from a hypothetical assumption and
reaches either a formally necessary conclusion or a hypothetically
necessary one. However, this particular argument starts from con–
tingent premises and strives to establish a categorically necessary
conclusion.
It
is
not a valid empirical argument.
It
is not a valid
rational argument.
The assumptions which are at the basis of this conception of
metaphysical knowledge are so far removed from those involved in
the theory and practice of modem scientific inquiry that perhaps we
should return to the suggestion that we use entirely different vo–
cabularies, to avoid confusion, and insist upon the complete autonomy
of metaphysics in relation to science. Not only does history make
this difficult, but also those contemporary metaphysicians who regard
experimental science as a defective or imperfect kind of philosophy of
nature. Consider such a typical attitude as that of V. E. Smith
(expressed again
in
P
hiloso
p
hieal Physics)
:
But how can this procedure (of modern science) meet the classical
rigor that a science must be certain, have a knowledge character, and
attain to causes? . . . What there is of knowledge proper in emperio–
logical physics is the fruit of philosophy.... Truly scientific knowledge
can never be purely descriptive since it is only in terms of causes and
reasons that science is science.
It is apparent that this school of metaphysical thought
c~not
let science alone despite its claim that the furthest reaches of .sclence
cannot touch it, and that its wisdom is immune
~o anythm~
the
sciences may discover. Because of its animus, the history of science
