0 R I G I N A L SI N , N AT U RA L LAW, A N D P0 L1 T I C S
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of morality. Can he be persuaded that there are essences which, when
unpacked, yield moral principles? Unfortunately he is often persuaded
too easily and our success with
him
should not give us too much
confidence. The point is that
all
of this philosophical machinery is
not so much an effective instrument for rational persuasion as for
self-encouragement, useful for philosophical whistling in the dark.
Having persuaded himself of
c~rtain
moral principles and having
discovered that some people in other places and at other times have
doubted them, the weak man needs support. He needs to say that
things
in
the realm of essence are so related as to substantiate or
corroborate these principles of morality.
We all have deep moral convictions: we firmly believe certain
moral principles which we try to act on to the best of our ability.
They make up, along with others, the foundations of our whole
structure of belief; they constitute our terminal beliefs. We want
them to be consistent with each other and to fit in harmoniously and
simply with other, less confidently held beliefs; we want this struc–
ture to mesh with experience and feeling. But individuals and so–
cieties have surrendered many beliefs which they once accepted as
terminal, and some of these beliefs are moral beliefs. What, then, is
the purpose of inventing a mysterious realm of essence
of which
our
terminal beliefs are supposed to be true? Wouldn't it be saner to
recognize that we
all
have our ultimate convictions at any moment,
that they are not absolutely immune to change (though we can
resolve, at our own peril, to make them permanently immune), that
some people adopt the same beliefs as terminal and others don't?
Who are the people we get along with? Very often the people with
whom we have a great deal of .agreement on these fundamental beliefs.
Who are the people we quarrel with? Very often those with whom
we don't share these beliefs. The point is that we and those whose
lines end up at the same terminal shouldn't need the kind of mutual
encouragement that comes from inventing a realm of essences beneath
(or above) the terminal: and those who go in different directions
are the last people in the world who are likely to use essences in the
same way even if they agreed that such things existed.
I hesitate to assign all of this view to Holmes, but I think that
it converges with what he says
in
his little essay "Natural Law."
First when he says: