0 RI G I N A L SI N , N A TU RA L LA W , A N D P0 Ll T1 C S
229
I do not think that Locke saw this contradiction, but it should
not escape the careful reader of his
Essay Concerning Human Under–
standing
and his
Second Treatise of Government,
both published in
1690. Locke tries to refute the belief that "there are in the under–
standing certain
innate principles;
some primary notions ... charac–
ters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul re–
ceives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it." But
an innate principle is quite different from a self-evident principle,
according to Locke, and therefore he is not involved in any obvious
inconsistency
here,
as some of his antagonistic critics have implied. It
was perfectly possible, Locke thought, for a man who believed as
he did that
all
our ideas arise out of experience, to hold that some
true statements whose terms expressed these ideas, are self-evident.
For example, the idea of red arises from experience, and the idea of
green does; nevertheless Locke maintained that anyone who grasps
these ideas, who understands the meanings of the terms "red,"
"green," and the others in the statement, "Nothing which is red all
over is green all over," will immediately assent to that statement. It
is therefore self-evident but
not innate.
Locke's blatant inconsistency consists in the fact that he says
in the
Essay
that there are no self-evident practical principles but
denies this in his
Second Treatise.
In the
Essay
he holds that so far
from there being innate practical principles, there are not even any
self-evident practical principles.
In the
Essay
Locke says:
I think
there cannot any one moral rule be proposed wh'ereof a man
may not justly demand a reason
[his italics]: which would be perfectly
ridiculous and absurd if they were innate;
or so much as self-evident
[my italics], which every innate principle must needs be, and not need
any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it appro–
bation. He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the
one side, or on the other side went to give a reason why 'it is impossible
for the same thing to be and not to be.' It carries its own light and
evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the
terms assents to it for its own sake or else nothing will ever be able to
prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken rule of
morality and foundation of all social virtue, 'That one should do as he
would be done unto,' be proposed to one who never heard of it before,
