0 R I G I N A L S I N , N A T U RA L L A W , A N D P0 L I T I C S
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But it
is
certainly wrong to say, as Lippmann does, that all of them
deny the existence of the universals or meanings which are so essential
for the philosopher of natural law.
In opposition to Lippmann, Locke, Aquinas, and the positivists,
to say nothing of a vast number of the other philosophers like Ber–
trand Russell and G. E. Moore in some of their writings, I think
that the notion of an analytic statement, the notion of a self-evident
statement as conceived by Aquinas and Locke, and the meanings so
dear to all of them and Lippmann, are first of all obscure in them–
selves and secondly incapable of sustaining the philosophical load
which has been put upon them. I shall concentrate on the significance
of this contention for the doctrine of natural law, though I can at
best outline only part of my view here.
Very few philosophers have taken the existence of meanings,
conceived as universals, for granted. The usual pattern of philosophi–
cal argument is to assume that the reader believes in the existence
of physical objects- the tables and chairs of epistemology books–
but that he is too dull to see that universals like the attribute of being
a table also exist. And so it is frequently pointed out that we couldn't
understand the general word "chair" unless it had a meaning quite
distinct from every individual chair in the universe. In this way the
existence of meanings construed as properties of things is supposedly
proven. But then a new move must be made, for the ordinary man
has a rather limited conception of existence; in other words he uses
the word "exists" narrowly, as applying only to physical objects which
exist in space and time, and this won't do.
Having begun with a tolerance and a garden-variety understand–
ing of the word "exist," the ordinary man has now been led to the
point where he must see that there are at least two meanings of
"exist" and that this is the solution to the problem of understanding.
But can any one suppose that this postulation of Platonic meanings
really illuminates the notion of understanding? We think immedi–
ately, and rightly so, of dormitive virtues "explaining" why opium
puts people to sleep.
The situation is even worse when we examine Lippmann's in–
troduction of essences. The Platonic theorist of understanding has
the comparatively easy job of showing how understanding is
possible,
whereas Lippmann must show that a belief in self-evident principles
