604
instance, a nationalized economy
for socialism in spite of its being
controlled by a bureaucratic elite
-permits the liberals to think of
Russia as a socialist state. Hence
their hope for the eventual liberali–
zation of the Soviet regime (in ad–
dition to their incurable optimism
which stems from their failure to
break with the notion of continual
progress).
On the other hand, their d evo–
tion to democratic and liberal val–
ues- "subjective intentions" -makes
them critical of the illiberal and
undemocratic features of the Sov–
iet regime.
pARTISAN
REVIEW is
blatantly unfair in omitting this
side of the liberal ambivalence. It
is this omission of not seeing the
liberal as ambivalent, but selecting
only one side of his ambivalence,
that leads to such distorted infer–
ences as presented in
PARTISAN
RE–
vmw and
The Protestant.
The
former, in its admitted hatred of
Stalinism, cannot conceive of any
manifestation of friendliness to–
ward Soviet Russia, however re–
luctant, but as "fifth column"
activity. The latter, manifestly Sta–
linist, cannot bear any criticism,
however well justified, without not–
ing a plot against Russia. Neither
journal can quite grasp what makes
the liberals tick.
The major political disease of
the liberal in recent times is the
lack of a self-critical attitude as
well as the lack of functioning as
a critic in general. Liberals could
speak of the Roosevelt administra–
tion and of the Stalinist regime as
the two great centers of dynamic
energy because they were essentially
PARTISAN REVIEW
uncritical. As a matter of fact, it
has become quite fashionable for
liberals to pride themselves on be–
ing different from the liberal of
the twenties who, as one spokesman
said, "was more likely to be a
critic than a man of action," and
who--it was rather gracelessly put
-"was brought up in a world
where other people did things and
he sat back and complained about
them." As a result of this pro–
fessed abdication of the critical
function, the liberals found it dif–
ficult to resist the bandwagon men–
tality which first developed with
the New Deal and later crystallized
in their uncritical support of the
policies of the Anglo-American–
Russian coalition. Loyalty to the
White House meant, in line with
the Roosevelt program, getting on
with the Kremlin.
When the liberals uncritically
accepted the anomalous decisions
made at Teheran and Yalta, they
invited the anomalous situation in
which they now find themselves.
Their lack of critical imagination
can only have the effect of keeping
them in a continual state of sur–
prise. They are surprised when
Stalin suddenly blames the war on
capitalism, and they are surprised
when "Big Three Unity" turns out
to be a myth. A further result of
the abdication of the critical func–
tion is the opportune feeling that
the latest is the best. And from
this concession to complacency it
is only a small step to the equally
convenient belief that present
trends will continue indefinitely
into the future.
I believe that the friendliness of
