The problem of the interaction between subject and object in the
process of cognition is a crucial issue in a theory of knowledge. Cognition, a unique
window on the objective world, has captured the attention and motivated research and
debate by scholars in a wide variety of fields over millennia. In all discussions
regarding the phenomenon of knowledge, one question has always been raised no matter what
the approach, method or focus of inquiry employed. For Kant, the distinction between
nomenon and phenomenon and the determination of categories were major concerns. For the
psychology of sensation and perception, the search continues for scientific methods to
settle the extent to which an individual vis ą vis the environment effects the
content, as well as the form, of sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic
philosophy, discussion revolves around the relation between ‘ālim and
ma‘lūm (knower and known). The question, expressed more precisely is: How much
of what we know can be credited to objective reality per se, and how much is the
creation, influence, or interference, of our mental power? It might also be asked how much
and in what ways this influence alters the reality of the object of our cognitive system.
Cognition is the result of a relation between the subject and object of
knowledge. The importance of this proviso led such philosophers as Abu al-Hassan al-Basrī
al-Ash‘arī (871-934) and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (1147-1209) to reduce knowledge to
this "relation" an instance of the category of al-idāfah — leaving
no room for any other element in determining its nature and definition. (1)
This relation was too obvious to be ignored or denied by their opponents such as Nasīr
al-Dīn Tūsī, (2) though they rejected such reductionism.
Here I will not enter into the debate over the definition of knowledge and whether it is a
mere relation, or a quality for the subject — as Abū ‘Alī Sīnā expresses it
in some of his writings (3) — or, as Suhrawardi (4)
has it, a manifestation identical to light. The purpose of this essay is an inquiry into
the way Mullā Sadrā (5) interprets the nature and role of
the subject-object relation in the process of cognition.
The notion of knowledge presupposes at least two elements: a subject
capable of knowing, and an object that can possibly be known. The first presupposition
entails, on the one hand, that not all beings are able to participate in such a relation
in order to acquire knowledge. It requires some conditions on the part of the subject as
one element in this process. Mullā Sadrā follows the majority of, if not all, Muslim
philosophers in considering immateriality (tajarrud) a necessary conditon. On the
other hand, it posits that the subject is not enough for knowledge. It is a necessary
condition but not a sufficient one. It requires another element, an object, before
knowledge occurs. The same conditions and implications (6)
apply to the object as well.
None of these presumptions precludes the possibility of an individual
entity becoming the object of its own knowledge. In such cases, the subject becomes known
to itself, but still the duality of the elements of knowledge is preserved, though with
certain considerations. Furthermore, an entity can engage in such a relation with itself,
if and only if it possesses the qualities and conditions of both elements, viz.
knowability and the ability to know. This knowledge can happen in two forms: knowledge by
presence (al-‘ilm al-hudūrī) and knowledge by representation (al-‘ilm
al-husūlī). (7)
Knowledge by Presence
Today the division of knowledge into hudūrī and husūlī
is an accepted reality in Islamic philosophy. While there are disagreements on the scope
of knowledge by presence, (8) all nevertheless consider its
object to be either the subject per se or one of its existential affairs (shu’ūn)
or associates which is immediately present before it. To attain this kind of knowledge, no
mediation is needed; rather, it is enough for the subject to possess the conditions of
both elements of knowledge.
This feature, distinguishing knowledge by presence from knowledge by
representation, on the one hand, robs it of its transferability. Knowledge resulting from
the presence of an object to a subject is a personal knowledge based on personal
connection. Other subjects have to engage in the same personal relation, should they want
to have the same kind of knowledge. There is no procedure by which knowledge by presence
may be taught or learned. Transmission of knowledge is only possible if the subject
benefits from an inter-subjective medium in order to connect to the object. Such an
intermediary is attainable by everybody, making it possible to relate to the object and
possibly arrive at the same knowledge. This medium, called representation, is peculiar to
knowledge by representation.
The unity of subject and object in the case of knowledge by presence,
on the other hand, guarantees its epistemological value. As Muhammad Husayn
Tabātabā’ī (9) has explained, the absence of an
intermediary eliminates the possibility of distortion. Falsehood is possible only when
there is an intermediary between the apprehender and what is apprehended, as it is
probable that the intermediary will not agree with the reality it conveys. Mahdi
Hā’irī (10) refers to this same feature of knowledge
by presence when he speaks of "its freedom from the dualism of truth and
falsehood." This may explain why Mullā Sadrā (11)
considers knowledge by presence as the most complete type of knowledge, if not the only
real one.
In knowledge by presence, the relation of subject to object is one of
unity and identity. To use the terminology of Muslim philosophers, here we are dealing
with the unity of knowledge, the knower, and the known. There is absolutely no distinction
between the phenomenon of knowledge, its subject and its object. The act of knowledge
stems from subject, extends to itself or its existential affairs, and this very connection
is called knowledge. There is neither mediation nor duality. Unity is the key to the
solidity of this type of knowledge that bars falsehood from its territory. The same
solidarity between subject and object culminates in this knowledge’s
untransferability, for with the transfer of such knowledge, the subject should also move
to the comprehensive realm of the second subject!
Does all of this lead us to conclude the impossibility of communicating
with others the content of one’s knowledge by presence? Although the answer is
clearly negative, it does not need a compromise on the part of the definition or
implications we have discussed so far. First of all, awareness of another person’s
knowledge by presence does not insinuate participation in the same cognitive relation.
Such awareness is not even followed by acknowledgment of its occurrence for the first
person; its only advantage for the second person is to be informed about one’s claim
to such knowledge. Secondly, and more importantly, this communication is made possible
only through knowledge by representation: the knower, by using certain concepts, tries to
render comprehensible what he or she has already found through knowledge by presence in
the form of corresponding representations. In the next step, one translates those concepts
into a dialogical language, communicating them to others. Having passed these phases,
knowledge acquires the feature of transferability at the expense of loosing another
property of knowledge by presence, namely impermeablity against falsehood. I would like to
explain this point a little further.
Knowledge by Representation
In contrast to knowledge by presence, knowledge by representation
depends on a conceptual medium. This means that the subject no longer has an immediate
contact with the object; instead, it relates to, and relies on, a concept that connects it
to the object. Concepts act as translators on which one has to rely in order to make
cognitive contact with the objective world. Because of this very dependence on, and need
for, the mediatory translator, the potentiality for falsehood emerges. It is always
possible that the mediatory concepts fail to fully and correctly convey the object of
knowledge. According to Mullā Sadrā, (12) one side of the
relation, viz. the relation between subject and concepts, is still immune from
error, for concepts are mental forms, created by a subject’s soul and comprehended
through knowledge by presence. The problem, however, remains for the other side, that is,
the relation of a concept to its corresponding object. Concepts are called mental forms (al-suwar
al-dhihnīyah) or mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī).
The problem of "mental existence," as an independent issue,
is one that has recently been considered by philosophy in general and by Islamic
philosophy in particular. (13) Muslim philosophers such as
Fārābī (872-950) and Ibn Sīnā, and even Shaykh-i Ishrāq, did not address this
problem directly, although they dealt with related topics such as the intelligibles (ma‘qūlāt),
the intellect and the intelligible (al-‘aql wa al-ma‘qūl), and
soul (nafs). Murtadā Mutahharī, in his excellent inquiry, (14)
concludes that this notion emerged for the first time in Islamic philosophy with Fakhr
al-Dīn Rāzī who discussed the notion of al-wujūd al-dhihnī in his al-Mabāhith
al-Mashriqīyah. (15) It was then elaborated by Tūsī
in Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, and Sharh-u Mas’alat al-‘Ilm. (16)
Thereafter, this problem was to become an intensely debated issue among Muslim
philosophers and theologians such as Khifrī, Sayyid Sadr, Sadr al-Dīn Dashtakī (d.
1497), his son Mīr Ghīyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī, and Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (1423-1502).
The dichotomy of mental-objective existence is usually considered as one of the
preliminary divisions of existence and is discussed under the rubric of existence and
privation (al-wujūd wa al-‘adam). That is because these philosophers adopted
the idea that knowledge or cognition consists in the presence of the object’s
quiddity (māhīyyat) before the subject. In other words, a subject creates a
quiddity in his or her mind by comprehending an object. (17)
Mullā Sadrā, like a majority of Muslim philosophers, affirms that
there is an existence and presence for objects, other than their unveiled presence and
manifest existence, which is called mental existence. The manifestations, or rather the
manifestors, of this mental existence are the intellectual faculties and sensory
instincts. (18) According to this theory, one and the same
quiddity has, sometimes, several types of existence and manifestation, some of which are
stronger than others, and the ensuing impressions of one level do not emerge from the
others. (19)
The notion of "substance" (jawhar) for instance,
applies to one and the same quiddity that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Sometimes
it exists as an independent and immaterial being, active and invariable, as in the case of
pure intellects (al-‘uqūl al-mufāraqah). At other times it needs
accompanying matter, impressed by other things, and is mobile and quiescent, like the
forms of a species. It can also take on another type of existence which is weaker than
both the above-mentioned types, since it is neither active nor impressed, neither constant
nor mobile nor quiescent; it is then a mental form and a subjective representation. (20)
Mental existence or the presence of mental forms in the mind is above
the dichotomy of substance-accident. It is a meta-category, identical with Being itself.
As Nasr (21) puts it, "[t]he knowledge that the soul
has of things is just like the illumination of the light of Being. This knowledge
establishes the form of that which is perceived in the mind, as Being establishes and
manifests the forms and quiddities of things externally."
Observation
This approach corresponds to a theory, called the principality of
quiddity (asālat al-māhīyat). According to this theory, a quiddity can manifest
itself in different types of being: objective or external and subjective or mental.
Conforming with this scheme, the process of cognition is explained as the realization of a
quiddity in the mind of a subject. Existence and being are nothing but creatures of the
mental power of the knower. The objective reality consists of quiddities. They can
manifest themselves in different realms, external and internal, while mental power
abstracts the notion of various types of being from different manifestations of
quiddities. In this way they try to bypass the dilemma surrounding the authenticity of
concepts in transmitting the objective reality. If a concept, or mental form, is nothing
but the same objective reality, and the only difference is its manifestation, it will
fully and correctly match the object of knowledge, and will leave no doubt about its
accuracy. Such an explanation is consistent with the theory of the principality of
quiddity of which Mullā Sadrā was a supporter when he was a student of Mīr Muhammad
Bāqir Dāmād Astarābādī, otherwise known as Muhaqqiq Dāmād (1525-1615). (22)
But based on the principality of existence, which forms the cornerstone of Mullā
Sadrā’s philosophy, (23) one needs another approach to
the problem which is harmonious with this basic concept. Principality of existence implies
that quiddity is nothing but a mental abstraction from certain beings of their outlines
which border on nothingness! Such an empty mental frame does not exist outside the mental
world except by virtue of some sort of intellectual consideration. Furthermore, not all
mental forms are instances of quiddity, for logical as well as philosophical secondary
intelligibles are not, at least directly in the case of philosophical secondary
intelligibles, abstracted from objective realities, and have no corresponding object in
the external world.
Mullā Sadrā, whose philosophy stands and falls with the principality
of existence, cannot content himself with repeating, or even modifying, what has been said
by philosophers of quiddity. He has to find another formula grounded in the principality,
as well as the gradation, of existence to prove that any mental form is in fact in the
same spectrum as its corresponding external object. This should explain why we abstract
the same quiddity from both the objective and subjective beings, and not the other way
around. Of course such an explanation should meet the challenge of those mental forms that
are not congruous with external reality and are judged as false, or those mental images
that have no existence outside the mental world such as the concept of
"nothingness" or logical concepts and secondary intelligibles.
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