EUROPEAN/AMERICAN RELATIONS: WHO LEADS?
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during these negotiations some progress was made regarding some of
the settlements and on issues revolving around improving the security in
the most narrow part of Israel, that some settlements would remain and
some would be removed. Can you comment about the Taba agreements
to any extent? Was there some reason why one side or the other chose
to have these issues brought to the front? Did someone fear some of the
things that were being discussed?
David Pryce-Jones:
As I understand it, there is no history of the Taba
negotiations or of the Camp David ones. We only know what we can
glean. But as we understand it, Mr. Clinton was very upset by the fail–
ure of Camp David and said to Arafat, "You have made me a failure."
Everyone had the sense of a moment slipping, of a historical moment
that could have been seized and wasn't. So they made these desperate
efforts at Taba.
It
was already after Mr. Bush had been elected, and was
in the very last days of Mr. Clinton's presidency. His power obviously
was waning. Perhaps it had already gone.
It
was a slightly doomed
moment, but as we understand it, Barak just gave him the whole shop
and said you can have it all. The 94 percent of the territory went up to
98 percent. We don't know why Arafat walked out and refused to do it.
His motives remain a mystery. We don't understand whether he thought
that he could get more and the Israeli offer was still insincere or whether
he thought that violence would get him what negotiation never could. I
suspect it's a mixture of both those things. Dr. Kissinger describes deal–
ing with Assad in his book . He went thirty-four times to Damascus, and
the thirty-fifth time, he said to Assad, "It's a pity, I've come here thirty–
five times now, and it's the end ." And he goes to the door and his hand
is on the door when Assad says, "Wait a moment, I can agree." As
Kissinger described it, it's because he wanted to make quite sure he got
the very last nickel. So maybe Arafat wanted the very last nickel too.
Miriam Caines:
I'm struck, Mr. Pryce-Jones, by the fact that you've obvi–
ously taken seriously Santayana's comment that if we don't learn from
history we will repeat it. I hope that you continue to be a prophet,
although prophets are rarely honored in their own times.
David Pryce-Jones:
It's dangerous to be a prophet. You get stoned. I
don't mean in the nice modern American sense either.
Chandler Rosenberger:
I think it's very interesting that in a panel on the
United States and Europe we have spent most of our time discussing
