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Jews in particular seemed to have been torn between conflicting emo–
tions. On the one hand, some Jewish critics of the war-and especially
those of the older generations-felt supportive of beleaguered
Yugoslavia. They remembered the heroic Serb partisans of World War II
fighting the Nazis and other anti-Semitic forces, such as the Croat
Ustashis. On the other side were Jews who supported NATO because
they perceived the horror of ethnic cleansing as being similar to the
Holocaust: "Hanging over Mr. Wiesel's visit Ito refugee camps in Mace–
donia I was the phrase 'never again,' " reported the
New York Times.
"'I've learned something from my experiences,' Mr. Wiesel said. 'When
evil shows its face, you don't wait. ...You must intervene.'" Anthony
Lewis quoted Vaclav Havel, another supporter of NATO intervention:
"Kosovo has no oilfields to be coveted; no member nation in the
[NATO] alliance has any territorial demands on Kosovo... .It is fight–
ing out of concern for the fate of others... because no decent person can
stand by and watch the systematic state-directed murder." Lewis added:
"NATO air attacks have killed Serbian civilians. That is regrettable. But
it is a price that has to be paid when a nation falls in behind a criminal
leader. "
Both the critics and supporters of the war alleged that the credibility
if not survival of NATO was at stake and led to the intervention. But
"credibility" became an issue
after
NATO's involvement. The com–
pelling reasons for intervention were the memories of Bosnia (NATO's
failure to prevent ethnic cleansing and mass murders) and the ample
television coverage of the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. It was by no
means essential for NATO and the U.S. to get involved in either Bosnia
or Kosovo, except for the moral-psychological pressure exerted by the
visual images of brutalized Kosovo Albanians and (earlier) Bosnians.
What was there to gain for the U.S. from independence or autonomy
for Kosovo? From militarily defeating the Serbs? From spending huge
amounts on the military campaign, on assisting the refugees and their
resettlement? From stationing more troops in that part of the world?
The desire to intimidate Russia has been suspected by some, both in this
country and Hungary. But why would NATO seek to intimidate in this
manner a thoroughly weakened and demoralized Russia, dependent
011
Western handouts?
If
anything, NATO airstrikes stiffened the backbone
of Russia, reviving its nationalism and hostility toward the U.S. and the
West. Solzhenitsyn's explanation personified the resurgent, resentful
nationalism in his part of the world: "NATO wants to impose its order
on the world. And Yugoslavia is needed as a terrible example. 'We will
punish Yugoslavia and the whole world will tremble.' And that was not
