216
PARTISAN REVIEW
judged the
be~t
could result in the best candidate being hired after all. And,
indeed, a pervasive disinclination to take women philosophers quite as seri–
ously as men surely is part of the reason why a woman may not be judged
the best even when she is. Furthermore, where junior appointments are
concerned, merit is in considerable measure a matter of potential; and per–
haps there is, still, enough subtle discouragement of young women to
justify the thought that a given level of achievement at the new-PhD stage
might indicate more potential in a young woman than
in
a young man.
It is often taken for granted that rules ensuring formal , procedural
equality-"equal-opportunity" or "anti-discrimination" policies, as we
say -would suffice (at least on the non-trivial assumption of an equal dis–
tribution of talent) for a representation of women equal to their
representation in the applicant pool; with, perhaps, some indirect effects
on the causes of their under-representation in that pool. But formal, pro–
cedural fairness does
not
necessarily guarantee equality of opportunity in
hiring, can
not
by itself ensure that there is no covert disadvantage faced
by women.
And now there looks to be a very simple argument that preferential
hiring is a good solution: it's a way, albeit a back-handed way, of getting
the best person appointed despite her sex. And if the man who is judged
the best isn't the best, he is not really wronged when preferential hiring
gives the job to a better, female, candidate.
But right away I start to worry about the price carried by the back–
handedness. If it is known (even
if
it is falsely believed) that the policy is
to
prefer women even when they are not judged the best, many of those
who are turned down will believe they have lost out to someone less capa–
ble than themselves. Doubtless, the resentment is often unjustified-for
every man who has failed to land an academic job because of preferential
hiring, there must be scores, at least, who
believe
they have--but it is real,
and has real effects, nonetheless. Worse, when it is known that a policy of
preferential hiring is in force, this encourages the belief-even when it is
false--that when a woman is appointed, it is because she is a woman, not
because she is the best. And this, besides tending to undermine women's
confidence in themselves, encourages precisely that disinclination to take
women academics quite fully seriously which sometimes prevents a woman
being appointed when she is the best.
Now I see why that role model argument worries me. It is of course
false that only a woman can be a role model for women, or that women
can be role models only for women. More to the present point, there is the
disturbing possibility that, by adopting a policy of preferential hiring, we
will give young women-and young men-the impression that women
aren't really worthy of academic positions. Even when it is false that this
