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Jefferson's election "is justified by unequivocal reason of PUBLIC
SAFETY." A few months later, however, his ambivalence toward John
Adams and his obsessive antipathy for Aaron Burr led him to support
Jefferson over Burr and to reject explicitly any attempt to thwart the
election. "Mr.Jefferson's character," Hamilton conceded with a concilia–
tory, almos t generous tone, "warrants the expectation of a temporizing,
rather than a violent system."
After an initial cooling-down period, Federalists reacted to their
defeat, not with talk of resistance, but rather as politicians who were accus–
tomed to power and who were intent upon recapturing it. The game of
majoritarian party politics would have to be played if Federalists were to
regain control of the government. Hamilton admitted in April 1802 that
"we must consider. . .employing the weapons which have been employed
against us."
"Nil desperandum"
wrote Gouverneur Morris when he learned of
Jefferson's victory. "Let the chair of office be filled by whomsoever it may,
Opposition will act as an outward conscience, and prevent the abuse of
power." Out of power, the Federalists seemed to appreciate the essential
contribution to democratic government that the opposition party can
make. The opposition party, noted the Federalist Fisher Ames, must be "a
champion who never flinches , a watchman who never sleeps." He advised
Federalists to exploit to the fullest their new role of critic. "We must make
it manifest that we act on principle," he wrote, "and that we are deeply
alarmed for the public good....We should...enjoy [our antagonists'] late
advantages of finding fault, which popular prejudice is ever prone to listen
to. We should soon stand on high ground, and be ready to resume the reins
of government with advantage." But despite their sophisticated remarks
about new strategies for the opposition party, the Federalists ultimately
collapsed as a national party, unable to develop a rank-and-file organiza–
tion and grass-roots support.
The strategy of party conflict had replaced the aspiration for consen–
sus. Although Washington, Hamilton, and other founders had feared that
poli tical parties would weaken the nation, the opposi te proved to be true.
This early creation of organized opposition
strengthened
the young repub–
lic by according legitimacy to dissent. The nation was sufficiently unified
in citizens' commitment to the Constitution to permit organized opposi–
tion to the party in power. The world of government and the world of
party politics had become one.
American government would henceforth operate as a "strange
hybrid," in the words ofJames MacGregor Burns, of the Madisonian poli t–
ical model, which aimed at stability in government, political equilibrium,
and snail-like change, and the Jeffersonian model, which sought vigorous
