94
PARTISAN
~VIEW
done in this area
(p.xiv).
CSP:
Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal
limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific
belief. ... The truth of the proposition that Caesar crossed the Rubicon
consists in the fact that the further we push our archaeological and other
studies, the more strongly will that conclusion force itself on our minds
forever - or would do so, if study were to go on forever. ... The same def–
initions equally hold in the normative sciences
(5.565- 6).
RR: I
do not think . .. that [your account] is defensible ... [It] uses a term
- 'ideal' - which is just as fishy as 'corresponds'
(PDT, pp.337, 338).
CSP:
[A] false proposition is a proposition of which some interpretant
represents that, on an occasion which it indicates, a percept will have a cer–
tain character, while the immediate perceptual judgment on that occasion
is that the percept has not that character.
A
true proposi tion is a proposi–
tion belief in which would never lead to such disappointment so long as
the proposition is not understood otherwise than it was intended
(5.569).
Prof. Royce [like you] seems to think that this doctrine is unsatisfac–
tory because it talks about what would be.... It may be he is right in this
criticism; yet to our apprehension this "would be" is readily resolved ...
(8.113).
[The] most important reals have the mode of being of what the
nominalist calls "mere" words, that is, general types and would-bes. [His]
"mere" reveals a complete misunderstanding ...
(8.191).
The
will be's,
the
actually is's,
and the
have beens
are not the sum of the reals.... There are
besides
would be's
and
can be's
that are real
(8.216).
SH: I
suspect, Professor Rorty, that your sympathies lie wi th the nomi–
nalist ...
RR:
Nominalists like myself - those for whom language is a tool rather
than a medium, and for whom a concept is just the regular use of a mark
or noise - ... see language as just human beings using marks and noises to
get what they want.
(EHO,
pp.126- 7).
The right idea, according to us nominalists, is that "recognition of
meaning" is simply ability to substitute sensible signs ... for other signs, ...
and so on indefinitely. This ... doctrine is found ... in [your writings]
(TMoL,
p.211).
CSP:
The nominalistic
Weltal1sc!tallllllg
has become incorporated into
what I will venture to call the very flesh and blood of the average mod–
ern mind.
(5.61).
Modern nominalists are mostly superficial men ...
(5.312).
