SUSAN HAACK
93
model of human solidarity
(SS, p.46).
CSP:
Other methods of settling opinion have [certain advantages] over
scientific investigation. A man should consider well of them; and then he
should consider that, after all, he wishes his opinions to coincide with the
fact ...
(5.387).
RR:
.. .
I think that the very idea of a "fact of the matter" is one we
would be better off without (pDP,
p.271) .
CSP:
...
he should consider that, after all, he wishes his opinions to coin–
cide with the fact, and ... there is no reason why the results of those ...
[other] methods should do so
(5.387,
cont.).
RR:
"True sentences work because they correspond to the way things
are" . . . [is an] empty metaphysical compliment, ... [a] rhetorical pat on
the back .... [The pragmatist] drops the notion of truth as correspondence
with reality altogether ... (CP,
p.xvii).
CSP:
Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object,
its
object,
ITS object, mind you
(5.554).
[However], that truth is the correspondence of a representation to its
object is, as Kant says, merely the nominal definition of it. Truth belongs
exclusively to propositions. A proposition has a subject (or set of subjects)
and a predicate. The subject is a sign; the predicate is a sign; and the propo–
sition is a sign that the predicate is a sign of that of which the subject is a
sign. If it be so, it is true. But what does this correspondence . .. of the
sign to its object consist in? The pragmaticist answers this question as fol-
lows... . If we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow
it out ... then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last resul t to
which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us
(5.553).
RR:
There are ... two senses apiece of 'true' and 'real' and 'correct repre–
sentation of reali ty,' ... the homely use of 'true' to mean roughly 'what you
can defend against all comers,' ... [the] homely and shopworn sense [and]
the specifically 'philosophical' sense ... which, like the Ideas of Pure Reason,
[is] designed precisely to stand for the Unconditioned ... (PMN,
pp.308-9.)
CSP:
That to which the representation should conform, is itself ... utter–
ly unlike a thing-in-itself
(5.553).
RR:
[A] pragmatist theory ... says that Truth is not the sort of thing one
should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about . . . (CP,
p.xiii).
Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to ... define the word
"true" ... supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be
