ROBERT WISTRICH
467
PLO; Arafat's word, it is said, is worthless; he is nothing but a blood–
stained terrorist; he has not changed the covenant, and so on. These
arguments may be true, but they are no longer adequate to convince a
majority of the Israeli public. What took place with the Oslo I and Oslo
II agreements happened despite the rising incidence of terrorism, which
many people expected would derail the process.
It
has not yet had that
effect, though Islamic terrorists are trying as hard as they can.
This means that the "politics of fear," a shorthand way of describing
the Likud strategy, is not working effectively with regard to the Israeli
public. That may change. I'm not saying that there is anything intrinsi–
cally wrong with appealing to fear, wherever, as in Israel, it is grounded
in a real threat. But Mr. Netanyahu will have to provide something more
positive than fear, if he is to win the coming elections. He has in fact
moderated his tone and taken a reasonably pragmatic line, but this stance
has come a bit late in the day. It may not be enough.
Question:
The question I have is one that arises from a comment made by
Henry Kissinger a number of years ago, that the thing he most feared in
the Middle East was a politics of regionalization, in which the forces of
fundamentalism, Israeli and Arab, would join together and create a true
change in the Israeli culture. Do you have a comment about that?
Robert Wistrich:
I think that this question, which I'm glad you brought
up, is looming in the background, casting a shadow over everything. And
it will undoubtedly have a bearing on the future. The question of
whether or not fundamentalism is the wave of the future or of the past is
going to be critical for the outcome on all fronts .
It
affects Israel domesti–
cally and in terms of its foreign policy, as well as the Arab states and the
wider world. Obviously, fundamentalism among Muslims is the joker in
the pack. Indeed, I would go further. I would guess that this was one of
the major reasons why Rabin and Peres made such a revolutionary tum
in their attitudes to the PLO and the possibility of a Palestinian state. I
think one of the most important considerations for them was the belief
that Islamic fundamentalism, driven by Iran, was an extremely dangerous
and growing force in the region as a whole. But it was still thought to be
containable, if Israel could take advantage of a relatively brief historic
moment to push through a comprehensive deal with more moderate Ar–
abs and with the Palestinians. This conceivably could neutralize much of
the power of fundamentalism, and create a coalition of interest between
Israel and some of the more stable Arab states.
With the PLO at the nadir of its fortunes in 1991, Israel decided to
rescue Arafat. It realized that the Gulf War had changed the power bal-
