ROBERT WISTRICH
455
outside of the country were shocked to discover that such fanatically in–
tolerant attitudes were more common than they had supposed. I find that
curious because the seeds have been there for a long time and are well
known to better-informed analysts of Israeli society.
There was nothing basically new in most of the ideological assump–
tions that motivated an individual like Yigal Amir. Nor is political
assassination as such something unprecedented or as novel in Israel as was
implied in some of the comments immediately after Rabin's murder.
It
is
true that it was the first time a prime minister was assassinated in Israel.
There were, however, political assassinations in the pre-state period, most
notably the Arlosoroff murder in the 1930s which has never been defini–
tively laid to rest. Significantly, it embittered and envenomed the politics
of the Yishuv for many decades. Blamed by the left on the "revisionist"
Zionist movement led by Jabotinsky, the assassination of Chaim Ar–
losoroff (who was then the most promising younger leader of Mapai)
would help set back the pre-Israel Zionist right for a generation.
After Rabin's murder, it was no surprise, therefore, that opinion polls
gave Mr. Peres a large and seemingly decisive lead in the personal contest
for prime minister over Mr. Netanyahu. This was obviously a direct out–
come of the fall-out from the assassination. Before that tragic event, the
two main parties had been running more or less neck and neck. If Yigal
Arnir had wanted to insure the election of a Labour prime minister, then
there was nothing more likely to achieve such a goal than his cold–
blooded act. He wanted to derail a peace process that he believed was
leading Israel to catastrophe. Instead, the immediate consequence was to
accelerate the process begun by Mr. Rabin.
The halo of martyrdom bestowed on Rabin ensured that a ground–
swell of sympathy surrounded his successor, Mr. Peres. Peres could never
match Rabin's reputation as "Mr. Security," despite the major role he has
played in creating and developing Israel's defense capacities. Nor did he
enjoy the same degree of public trust, though his diplomatic talent was
certainly recognized. For years, he had been Rabin's bitterest rival in La–
bour Party politics, and until the peace process began, they had never
been able to effectively work together. But since the assassination and
despite the domestic distrust of his intentions, Peres's image as a national
leader has greatly improved.
What does all this mean in the long run? Has there been a significant
transformation of Israeli politics, of the tone of the debate, and a change
in the perception of core issues? If we look at three major areas that con–
front Israel in its domestic and external affairs - the Golan, Jerusalem, and
the future of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank - then the present
government is faced with some very tough dilemmas. On the Golan issue
