MARK KUfliANSKY
495
of communication come from the colorful use of metaphor. For exam–
ple, the lowest level of civil servant in rural Haiti, an assistant to a sec–
tion chief, is popularly called a
sO llkel-laro,., ze,
a collector of the dew. I
recently heard "eating our fingers" used as a way of saying that there was
nothing to eat. That is the way Haitians talk. When Westerners inter–
view Aristide , he seems dreamy and unfocused, but one of the reasons he
has such tremendous popular appeal is that he is brilliant at this imagina–
tive Creole style of expression.
The pitfalls in understanding Haiti point to the absurdity of an im–
migration policy whereby fleeing Haitians tell their stories to U.S. im–
migration officers who then determine if there is a valid claim of politi–
cal persecution. If there is not, the Haitian is sent back. While almost
twenty-four percent of all asylum requests in the U.S. are accepted, fewer
than two percent of Haitian claims are. From 1981 until Aristide's inau–
guration in Februaty 1991, six of the twenty-one thousand Haitians in–
tercepted at sea were granted asylum. Since the overthrow of Aristide
the acceptance rate has increased only slightly.
ABC television commentator David Brinkley summed up the Haitian
situation this way: "A bloodthirsty gang of killers who control the peo–
ple who would leave for Miami tomorrow if they could." Aside from
the obvious fact that Haitians have many hopes for their country other
than being able to leave it, Brinkley holds another pivotal misconcep–
tion : The current rulers of Haiti, albeit bloodthirsty, are more than just a
gang. They are the strong-arm side of an entire segment of Haitian soci–
ety. If Haiti had been a democracy overthrown by a small clique, then
reversing the coup would be a possibility.
This is why the focus of Clinton's policy of forcing the current
leaders to step down will yield very little. If a deal could somehow be
made to bring Aristide back as President, he would be in the exact situa–
tion he was in after he was elected. Even if the "gang" that currently
rules were removed from the equation, Aristide's enemies, the ones who
control all the money and all the guns, would simply wait once more
for their moment
to
overthrow him. What would stop them? If Aristide
were brought back through U .S. military might, there would be two
options: The U.S. could install him and then leave, in which case he
would easily be overthrown as the puppet of a foreign power, or U.S.
troops could stay there and keep him in office. Then the troops , the
U .S. government, and Aristide would become the objects of hate and
the scapegoats for the many ills of Haitian life.
United States policy is flawed in its fundamental concept: the idea
that the U.S . can exert leverage on Haiti by threatening the country
