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and which is contain ed in the local fo rms of art and reli gio n , because they
provide the sensuous ga tew3Y to th e uni ve rsa l idea. Fo r Hegel, the aim of
educati on is
Bildllll,{!,
that untranslatable word deno ting, in H egel's wo rds ,
a "rising towards the uni versa l," a transcendence o f the tribal pieti es to–
wa rds a vision o f th e who le . The humaniti es as we kn ow th em were
shaped by one o f th e projects o f modernity, the desire to know the hu–
man heart in its entirety and so to justifY the ways o f man to man .
Thi s brin gs me to the advan ce o f soc ial sc ien ce. H as n o t the
Enlightenment p roj ec t precisel y threa tened the subversio n o f humane
edu cati on by soc ial sc ience? Fo r if th ere is a sc ience whi ch has the very
same subj ect matter as some human study, sho uld no t the sc ience prevail ,
rendering th e o ld res ults and methods superfluo us, and perhaps even ex–
posing them as parts o f some hidden soc ial o r po liti ca l age nda? N ow w e
know, for example , th at math emati cs ca n never be subve rted by th e so–
ciology of math emati cs. To explain th e soc ial practi ce of geometry is to
give no procedure fo r assess ing the va lidity of its theorems. Mathemati cs
is an auto nomous di sc iplin e, whi ch deli ve rs kn owledge quite independent
of its own soc ial ex planati o n . Likewise. it co uld be reasoned , if the hu–
maniti es could be shown to have th eir own meth ods, their own results ,
and their own au tonomous body o f kn owledge, they too could be saved
from the incursio ns o f soc ial sc ience .
Thus arose th e sea rch fo r meth od in the humaniti es, by whi ch they
would be distingui shed from th e natural sc iences, w hile showing th em to
be obj ec ti ve in some way th at dese rved th e name of knowl edge. This
search began at the ve ry o utse t o f th e academi c re voluti o n , with the uni–
versal hermeneuti cs of Schlei ermac her. Later thinkers - Dilth ey, Husser! ,
Schutz, and Ga dall1 e r - re fin ed th e pos iti o n bequ ea th ed th em by
Schl eiermac her, but w ith o ut makin g clear w hat kind o f understanding
comes from the hertll eneuti ca l meth od , o r even whether "method" is the
right way to desc ribe it. T o say that the humaniti es are co nce rned with
the interpretati o n o f hUIll :l11 li fe and artifac ts is no do ubt tru e , but with
what is interpretati o n being contrasted , and what are the ground rules? To
say, with Dilthey, that we understand the human wo rld through an ac t of
Verstehell ,
di stin ct from any p roj ect of scientifi c explanati o n , is surely also
tru e. But what prec isel y is
Vc rsicli clI ,
and how is it di sc iplin ed , so as to
present a full er, tru er, ri cher, mo re sa tisfYing pi cture o f its obj ect' Finally,
to say that th e human sc iences take
IlI callill}Z
as th eir subj ec t matter is un–
excepti onable , but whi c h mea nin g is inte nd ed ' If th e hi sto ry of
hermeneuti cs has been so un sa ti sfac to ry, it is thro ugh its emph as is on
method in th e abse nce of a de fin ed goa l. It is imposs ibl e to answer
whether thi s or th at meth od is appropriate to th e study o f a text, a work
