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entertained of retaining or reestablishing its power in the new system
through more democratic means.
There were other reasons as well for the oligarchy to give up: the
deepening economic crisis, and the precipitous decline of living standards
since the early I<JROs, which called into question the so-called "social
contract," the tacit acceptance of the regime by the population in ex–
change for improved living standards and non-interference in private
lives.
In
addition, the party was increasingly taken over or influenced by a
younger generation of leaders; it also became clear after Gorbachev's rise
to power that the Soviet Union would not, as in
1956,
save the regime
from being overthrown by its own people.
Despite the beneficial effects and byproducts of a long period of "soft
Communism" and what it entailed - decline of regimentation, enlarged
freedom of expression, an acceptance by the authorities of the separation
of the priv3te 3nd the public realm, a greater toler3nce for priv3te enter–
prise, and so on - Hankiss is not optimistic about the long-term prospects
of political democr3cy in Hung3ry. The P3st is likely to weigh he3vily on
the present and fu ture. H3n kiss reports tlldt 3S of
1978
Hungary had a
lower level of soci31 particip3tion (defined as the belief that people can do
something against ll1e3SUres that offend their interests) th311 Turkey or
Mexico. But he 3150 notes that, surprisingly enough, by
1989
"this inf3n–
tilistic dependence of the population
011
the politic3l leadership [had]
vanished." He is most concerned with 3 spiritual or value crisis that will
linger on:
If people.
cannot rely on a relatively strong and consistent value
system , they lose one of the most important organizing principles and
regulatory forces in their lives. If their values arc dcstroycd, it will bc
much more difficult for them to preserve . .. thcir sense of social re–
sponsibility. This is what happened in Hungary after
1948.
The de–
struction was far-reaching, or ahnost total. As a conscquencc
Hungarian society is still in a profound spiritual and Illoral disarray.
The reader may also wonder whether or not Hankiss is an historica l
or economic determinist, or merely a pessimist, as Hungarians and
Hungarian intellectuals arc reputed to be. He writes in 3 concluding
postscript:
To creatc and run democratic systems in countries with a per capita
gross national product of between
S2,SOO
and
$3,000
will be a hcroic
endeavor.
Political despotism has collapsed, but thc iron laws of
economy will keep the country in a forced orbit.
