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PARTISAN REVIEW
The nationalism of a large nation may take two forms: either the ag–
gressive-xenophobic form or the liberal-imperialistic form. The
aggressive-xenophobic form finds expression in slogans like "Russia for
the Russians," or "Serbia for the Serbs." Thus, for example, an aggressive
Russian chauvinist would disqualify both Osip Mandelstam and Joseph
Brodsky from the ranks of true Russians, not only because of their na–
tional origin, but also and equally because of the liberal-universalist
message of their writings. The spirit of the Black Hundreds flows in this
aggressive chauvinism, which speaks of a racial ideal embodied in the
national history, the true meaning of which can be revealed only to the
initiated. Liberal imperialism appears to be the opposite of aggressive
chauvinism. It decisively rejects anti-Semitism and all forms of aggressive
xenophobia. Propagating the idea of an open society, it remains inclusive.
Yet while allowing anyone to be a Russian, it categorically opposes the
aspirations of other nations to sovereignty, perceiving such aspirations as
ethnic separatism. For a liberal imperialist, anyone may be a Russian: a
Ukrainian, an Estonian, a Tartar, an Armenian, even a Jew. However, a
Ukrainian who desires to be a Ukrainian, in a sovereign Ukrainian state,
will immediately be labeled a "primitive nationalist." Of course, Russians
claiming sovereignty for their own state would not apply the
"nationalist" label to themselves. No Russian historian has ever referred
to such historical events as the Russian struggle for liberation from the
Tartar yoke, the Russian uprising against Polish rule in seventeenth-cen–
tury Moscow, or the Russian resistance against Napoleon and Hitler, as
examples of Russian separatism.
The distinction between xenophobic chauvinism and liberal imperi–
alism should not be underestimated. This difference carries an important
meaning for the history of Russia, and it defines the very essence of the
Russian nation. Yet from the point of view of a small nation, fearing–
with good reason - that it will be totally Russified, the distinction may
feel trivial. For the past seventy years, the Ukrainian has feared that his
national identity was in grave danger. He has feared Russification, the
total eradication of his national identity. He has feared the pitfalls of a
pan-Slavism that would deny Ukraine its claim to nationhood. He has
feared that the world would be convinced - indeed that he himself
would be convinced - that Ukraine was only some regional variant of
Great Russia, and that the Ukrainian language is but a dialect of the
Russian language. While the Russian nation felt itself to be a victim of
Bolshevik tyranny, the Ukrainian has felt himself to be a victim of Rus–
sian tyranny. The same could be said about the Lithuanian, the Slovenian
in Yugoslavia, or the Slovak in Czechoslovakia.
