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nationalism and egocentrism, they are present in some statements of
Rousseau himself, taken in isolation from their context and from Rousseau's
thought as a whole. This explains the erroneous interpretations of some his–
torians, who took certain arguments at their face value instead of recognizing
them for the subtle disguises or naive illusions they were-and went on to
blame humanism for crimes committed in the name ofwhat were actually its
perversions. For the same reason, the latter seem to me to place democratic
principles in greater jeopardy than do remnants of
ancien
regime
ideology,
that
is,
anachronistic nostalgia for absolute monarchy.
Comparing the humanism of Montesquieu and Rousseau with nine–
teenth-century scientism, nationalism and egocentrism allows us to make a
further observation. Each of the latter three doctrines restricts itself to a sin–
gle aspect oflife and eliminates or neglects all the others. For scientists, the
only thing that counts is universality (the common appurtenance ofall human
beings to the same species); this fundamental identity implies that the same
laws should be imposed the world over, to the end of creating a single uni–
versal state. Differences among cultures (or nations, in this sense of the
word), are held for naught-it will suffice, said Auguste Comte, to pin a na–
tional ribbon onto the universal flag. Variations among individuals are simi–
larly undeserving of notice. Conversely, nationalists like Michelet reject both
universal references and the aspirations of individuals to autonomy.
As
for
egocentrists like Rene and his countless descendants, they are concerned ex–
clusively with themselves, and remain as oblivious to the universal perspec–
tive as to that of national cultures. Each of these attitudes leads to disastrous
results.
The lesson one can draw from Montesquieu and Rousseau is that all
three of these aspects of existence-all three levels of organization of human
life-are necessary, and that it is dangerous to favor one
to
the detriment of
the others. Montesquieu was capable of acknowledging the individual's right
to autonomy, personal security, and private freedom; for all that, he did not
deny the importance of cultural appurtenance
(l'esprit des nations).
Moreover, though his contemporaries may not always have been aware of
it, he also preserved a universal reference-without which, indeed, one could
make no value judgment at all: tyranny is despicable under every sky, and
the interest of humanity must be considered over that of one's native land.
The same is true of Rousseau, who described the different types of
interaction among individuals as follows: "Now that we have dealt with
man's physical relationship to other living beings and his moral relationship to
other men, it remains for us to consider his civic relationship to his fellow
citizens." The personal, sociocultural and moral dimensions of existence must
neither be eliminated nor substituted for one another: human beings are
