TSVETAN TODOROV
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spects, Romanticism was opposed to Enlightenment rationalism and univer–
salism; however, as far as the subject at hand is concerned, there is no clear
break between the "Romanticism" of Chateaubriand, Michelet, and Renan.
and their point of departure in individualist philosophy as it was broadly
sketched in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Secondly,
to claim that scientism, nationalism, and egocentrism derive directly and logi–
cally from Enlightenment philosophy itself is inaccurate. Rather, the conclusion
I come to is that, while not wholly foreign to the spirit of the Enlightenment,
they represent a deflection of that spirit. The villain of the story is neither an
invading outsider nor the hitherto hero-but rather the associates, confeder–
ates, and companions of the hero. Long thought to be indispensable, they are
actually anything but that: in fact, they threaten to destroy everything their
ostensible master has created.
Two facts in particular lead me to this conclusion. The first is the logical
incompatibility between humanistic theory and scientific, nationalistic, or ego–
centric practice. Scientism (as expounded by Saint-Simon, Comte, or Renan)
claims to be rational, but it winds up treating science as a religion, thus un–
dermining its very essence. As for Michelet or Peguy, they are obliged to
resort to highly specious arguments in order to reconcile humanism with pa–
triotism. Chateaubriand, in turn, must deal with the contradiction of trying to
affirm simultaneously that he loves the human species and takes interest only
inhimsel£
The second reason for which I do not see humanism as leading in–
evitably to scientism, nationalism, and egocentrism is that one can analyze the
latter perversions using concepts and principles derived from humanism itself.
It
was Rousseau who stated that ethics should not be subordinated to science,
that cosmopolitanism and patriotism were incompatible (and the former
ethically superior to the latter), and that it was impossible to imagine an
individual apart from society. It was Montesquieu who declared moderation
to be a universal principle of political life, independent of the objective
conditions peculiar
to
each country, who pointed out that valuing one's
particular culture ("l'esprit de la nation" ) did not necessarily imply blind
patriotism, and who revealed the crucial role played in individuals' lives by
their social appurtenance. The ideals formulated by Montesquieu and
Rousseau enable us both to comprehend and judge the "deflections" of
Enlightenment philosophy perpetrated by the nineteenth century. These
deflections, far from being the logical outcome of humanism, represent its
desouction.
It is true that, historically speaking, they began to emerge at the same
time as the Enlightenment itself: scientism first made its appearance as the
materialism of Helvetius and Diderot, or the utopianism ofCondorcet; as for
