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PARTISAN REVIEW
tory?
If
it is indeed produced by a philosophy of life and a moral
philosophy, then its purpose cannot be other than a call for action
and change. In the second book that call was clear: philosophy of
history can only interpret the history of mankind; it is now up to the
last social class , the proletariat, to liberate itself and at the same time
to liberate mankind. But what change did he call for in the first
book? Since in this book the future was unavailable for interpreta–
tion , the answer is less clear. But the references to Dostoevsky sug–
gest that the change called for accords with the much later call to
authenticity or to Rilke's call: you must change your life.
Although some writers pointed to a religious background in
Lukacs's urge for a change in both books , their religious connotation
is doubtful. But there is a dogmatic element in these calls. For the
diverse parts of his views in both books are held together by the
master argument - which is undermined even by the mildest form of
skepticism. It is easy to see this point.
If
a critical theorist claims that
he has knowledge of history's plot and that he knows about others'
needs, then he has good reasons for demanding action in accordance
with these needs. Now, if others fail to act in accordance with these
needs , then he can at best claim that they are alienated from their
needs . Or he could say : the proletariat has been duped by the
bourgeoisie. But for how long can you go on repeating these claims?
If
neither confirmation nor disconfirmation of your claims are accep–
table , you will repeat them exactly as long as it takes you to begin
doubting them yourself. Once you doubt them, the master argu–
ment will fail to convince you , and this form of the politicization of
aesthetics is defeated.
What is alive in Lukacs's thought, if we abandon the master
argument? About three years ago I was asked to contribute to his
one hundred-year anniversary celebration . At celebrations we ac–
centuate the positive and leave unmitigated criticism for other occa–
sions. Thus I was surprised that my criticisms were considerably
more muted than those of my colleagues at the conference. I showed
the usefulness of his distinction between narrating and describ–
ing- a distinction originally introduced in the context of literary
works but useful in historiography. These distinctions and valuable
insights deserve further development.
Other concepts do not survive the failure of the politicization of
aesthetics. Unless the concepts of class and class consciousness are
firmly anchored in empirical studies and in model-building in the
