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PARTISAN REVIEW
claim that all other reasonable persons would judge as I do. I need
not ask whether they in fact judge as I do; a judgment that agrees
with mine is imputed to them. But what if others disagree with my
judgment? Then, there are only three alternatives: I hold on to my
aesthetic judgment despite all disagreement; I retreat to a judgment
of taste; or I revise my aesthetic judgment. A retreat to a judgment
of taste - "it is pleasant
to
ml'
is one of Kant's examples;
"I
like it"
would be my example - effectively removes that judgment from fur–
ther discussion.
Only the first alternative is of any interest for the further
development of my argument. I hold on to my judgment that claims
universal validity notwithstanding the contrary judgment of others.
According to my views, their judgment is mistaken, for it is based on
what they wish and not on what they need. The fundamental dis–
tinction between what others praise and what they need was in–
troduced by Schiller, and he had already concluded in
Letters on
the
Aesthetic Education of Mankind
(1794-1795) that others opt for what
they praise, because they are alienated from their real needs. Mar–
cuse's readers noticed his intellectual roots were in Kant and
Schiller; so are Lukacs's.
"Render to your contemporaries what they need, not what they
praise" was Schiller's advice to the ideal artist. This advice is in the
background of Lukacs's views as well as the Frankfurt School's criti–
que of the entertainment industry and mass culture. This advice was
also the keystone of our own master argument. The argument may
be considered elitist or arrogant: as a critic I arrogate to myself
knowledge of aesthetic value; as a critical theorist I claim to know
what others need, regardless of their views on the matter. Both
knowledge claims are based on my reflections that do not require
confirmation by others, whose needs are
in
question. The disconfIr–
mation of these claims by them merely reinforces my assumption
that they are alienated from their needs. We have learned the three
steps of our master argument from Lukacs, but he did not invent
them; they were available for more than a century before he applied
them.
Now, as long as critics or critical theorists do not have the
power to enforce their views, and as long as their activities are
restricted to aesthetic matters, these views are harmless. It will be
remembered that - according to Kant - the logical quantity of
aesthetic judgments is singular: "this painting is beautiful."
If
you
