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fenses and arms control is that the Soviet Union would almost cer–
tainly respond to our deployment of strategic defenses by deploying
a strategic defense system of their own. This would have the possibly
beneficial effect of restoring strategic balance between the Soviet
Union and the United States . Beyond this, such a development
should not be viewed with much enthusiasm because it would dilute
our retaliatory capabilites . Depending on how effective a Soviet anti–
ballistic system appeared to be , we could respond either by develop–
ing penetration aids for our offensive ballistic missiles or by building
up our retaliatory forces in other areas, such as cruise missiles.
One should, of course, also worry whether deployment of
strategic defense systems by both the United States and Soviet
Union will increase the likelihood of a global nuclear war.
It
should
perhaps be pointed out that since the expected level of destruction is
much reduced with an effective strategic defense system in place, the
probability of global nuclear war would have to increase drastically
in order to negate the positive effects of strategic defense . While I
don't believe we understand what determines the probability of nu–
clear war well enough to rule out this possibility entirely, I don't see
what factors would lead to a drastic increase in the probability of
nuclear war either. On the other hand, it probably would be prudent
to retain some level of retaliatory forces in case there were some fac–
tors affecting the likelihood of nuclear war that we didn't foresee .
Given that we must retain nuclear retaliatory forces even with a
strategic defense system in place, it is reasonable to ask again why
we should bother to continue research on a strategic defense system.
I believe the principal reasons are
a)
it is conceivable that we can
build a defensive system that would make current and future genera–
tion Soviet ICBMs obsolete ; and
b)
damage levels in case of a Soviet
first strike would be greatly reduced.
As a final point, the critics of strategic defense have consistently
underestimated the political significance of the SDI. The attitude of
the Soviet leaders toward arms control negotiations has already been
dramatically altered. It is clear that the Soviet leaders fear that stra–
tegic defense is a threat to the military superiority of the Soviet
Union. The critics of the SDI assert that this is "destabilizing." I am
persuaded that, to the contrary , a partial disarming of the Soviet
Union is a very attractive political goal. In addition , the technology
of strategic defense will serve civilization ultimately by protecting
our cities against nuclear attack.
