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PARTISAN REVIEW
tronic switching system.
It
is significant that Solomon Buchsbaum,
Vice President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, is generally optimis–
tic concerning the software and reliability requirements for a strategic
defense system. Assuming that the physical requirements for a stra–
tegic defensive system can be met, I believe, on the basis of what has
already been achieved in computer technology, that a system could
be built that would destroy 99.9 percent of the incoming missiles.
Let us now consider the question of whether deployment of
strategic defense is a good idea. Insofar as unilateral deployment of
strategic defenses by the United States will enhance nuclear deter–
rence, such deployment can be viewed as beneficial. The real ques–
tion, however, is how would the Soviet Union respond to such de–
ployment? Before discussing this question, I would like to comment
on the allegations that unilateral deployment by itself would be
"destabilizing."
It
is admittedly true that unilateral deployment of strategic de–
fenses would disturb the strategic balance between the United States
and the Soviet Union and would possibly give the United States a
first strike advantage. It is questionable, though, whether this is
likely to increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Since our nuclear
deterrent capabilities would be enhanced by unilateral deployment
of defenses, it seems implausible that the Soviet Union would be in–
duced to launch a first strike by our deployment.
(It
would certainly
not be induced by any rational form of reasoning.) On the other
hand, it would not be rational for the United States to launch a first
strike under these circumstances for several reasons. First of all, a stra–
tegic defense system would not be perfect, and, therefore, launching a
first strike would
guarantee
destruction of a certain number of Ameri–
can cities. Secondly, the probability that a strategic defense system
would fail completely is too high to merit its use as a shield for a first
strike. Thirdly, at any given time the United States would have the
option of strengthening its defenses as a means of decreasing the dif–
ference in damages sustained between striking first and responding
to a first strike.
Of course, these arguments would become much weaker if an
insane political leader were to come to power in the Soviet Union or
any other country for that matter. In such a case, if strategic
defenses were only partially deployed, it might appear rational in
time of crisis to launch a first strike if a first strike by the other side
appeared imminent. It is likely, however, that even in such a situa–
tion the United States would not be able to bring itself to strike first.
One way to escape having to make such a difficult decision is to
