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have seen, who could be depicted by the Sandinistas as mercenaries
because they were used by the United States. As Christian herself
puts it, it was unclear whether the administration sought to over–
throw the Sandinistas or use the
contra
as a chip to stop arms supplies
to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nevertheless, she argues that to meet the
needs of Nicaraguan democrats, there must be "a more intervention–
ist policy than the United States has been willing to commit itself to
in recent history." On the other hand, Christian argues that a secu–
rity guarantee
could
be worked out with the Sandinistas. The most
ardent Stalinists like Tomas Borge might be willing to accept a trade–
off- an end to arms shipments in return for a
modus vivendi
with the
Sandinista regime - since then they would be free to move Nicaragua
in the complete direction of a Cuban-Soviet model state. Paradoxi–
cally, however, the more moderate elements among the FSLN lead–
ership - those from the pre-Revolution Tercerista faction - might be
willing to open up things internally, but are less likely to want to
cease all support to nearby Central American revolutionaries .
Christian eschews "black and white choices between national
security and national conscience," and warns against accepting either
a right-wing authoritarian regime that is hospitable to the United
States, or a left-wing regime simply because it promises not to be
interventionist. But if Nicaragua pledged not to aid other guerrilla
armies, cut its ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union, then from a
security standpoint, the United States could live with it - as it does
with China and Yugoslavia. We might express distress that the Rev–
olution ended with the defeat of true democrats with whose ideals we
sympathize, but there would remain little justification for seeking to
put military, economic and diplomatic pressure in order to isolate
and overthrow the government. The fact is, as Christian is forced to
admit, "the possibility always existed for a negotiated settlement of
sorts between the United States and the FSLN . . . the Sandinistas
appeared willing to satisfy U .S. national security concerns, includ–
ing some kind of agreement terminating Sandinista support for the
Salvadoran guerrillas." But she hints she is opposed to that kind of
deal, since it would entail United States abandonment of the
contra
and consolidation of the Sandinista regime internally.
The question, then, is whether Nicaragua's increasingly Lenin–
ist structure alone gives the United States the right to intervene to
put in power those we find more desirable. Christian would say it
does. But then, if internal repression which we oppose is the criterion
for intervention, then the United States would have a moral obliga-
