PETER
L.
BERGER
327
(3) I am responsible for my own actions; I am not responsible for the ac–
tions of others; no one else is responsible for nry actions.
This proposition is
primarily ethical.
It
has both Hellenic and biblical roots; in both
cases , it brought about a moral revolution. It liberates men from
moral bondage both in the present (the collective responsibility of,
say, one's tribe) and to the past (carrying along the moral accounts of
one's ancestors).
(4)
What I am to nryselj within nryselj is what is most real to me, and
only on the basis of this reality can I reconstruct the reality of the world in my
mind.
This proposition, unlike the preceding ones, is more specifically
modern . It is at the heart of what has been called "the turn to the
subjective" in modern Western thought, from the Cartesian revolu–
tion in philosophy to the rise of the novel and the appearance of
modern psychology.
It
is, above all, an epistemological proposition,
but it has had vast consequences in the manner in which both self
and world are experienced .
(5) Whatever rights I may have as a member of my community, I also
have rights that pertain to myselj as a unique individual; if necessary, these
rights have to be asserted against nry own community.
Again, in its mature
form this is mainly a modern proposition.
It
is at the heart of the
democratic tradition - philosophically, politically, and legally.
It
is
above all an assertion of the individual's right to dissent and not to
conform, not only in thought (which, for example, the Stoics would
have asserted) but in actions .
(6) I have the capacity to choose my life, my world andfinally my own
self, and I assert the right to realize tMs capacity.
Once again, this proposi–
tion has different roots, but perhaps it could be called the American
proposition
par excellence
(America being a special case of Western
modernity).
It
refers to much more than what is colloquially known
as "the self-made man" (though it refers to that too). It implies that
the individual can, and perhaps ought to, decide how he should live,
what he should believe in, and ultimately who he will be. In this, it
represents the most radical, truly Promethean thrust of Western in–
dividuality.
• •
•
These are tentative , preliminary formulations: they are neither
final nor exclusive. They constitute pointers to an empirical
phenomenon - no more, but also no less. The important result of
this reflection is to begin putting concrete content into our intuition
that Western individuality is distinctive. And every one of the above
propositions (which, again, are to be understood as experiential as
