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an idea of individual autonomy in the roots of Western civilization–
an idea that has had very powerful empirical consequences. Follow–
ing Georges Sorel's use of that term, we may say that this idea has
been one of the most powerful "myths" of modern Western history , a
vision inspiring revolutions in every area of social life. Of course this
development can be studied by the historian of ideas . But, insofar as
ideas have empirical consequences , they cannot be studied as ideas
only . It is not just that some people (philosophers, poets , legal
theorists) have
thought of
the individual as being autonomous ; much
larger numbers of people have
experienced
themselves and others as
autonomous individuals. This experience has been embodied in a
variety of
institutions,
which in turn are experienced as having an ob–
jective reality outside the mind of the individual. Thus the autono–
mous individual experiencing both psychological and social
realities
is
much more than "an idea" (though he is that too). Put simply, the in–
dividual may forget or set aside an idea in his mind ; he cannot do
this with a structure of his own self-experience , let alone an institu–
tional structure of his society.
Here, then, are some propositions that begin to delineate both
the idea and the experience to which the phrase "the autonomous in–
dividual" refers . These propositions are stated from the vantage
point of the individual:
(1) I am unique, over and beyond any traits I have in common with
others, even those others to whom I belong most fully .
This proposition ,
presumably, expresses the root experience of autonomous individu–
ality, and affirms it in the face of, and if necessary
against,
every con–
ceivable collective identification.
It
is both an ontological and an
ethical proposition. Ontologically, it affirms that the uniqueness of
the individual is his essential reality. Ethically, it implies that this
uniqueness ought to be recognized by all others; as such, it is the
root assumption of every (Western) assertion of the rights of the in–
dividual as against his community .
(2)
I have within myself the capacity to act in such a way that my actions
are determined by myselfand by myselfalone.
Or more simply:
I have within
myself the capacity to befree.
This , if you will, is the Hellenic proposition
par excellence.
Again, it has both an ontological and an ethical aspect :
I assert my freedom as a reality of my being; at the same time, I
assert the moral right to express this reality in action . (Historically ,
of course, it was much later that there came the corollary assertion
that my own claim to freedom must necessarily be universalized:
If
I
claim freedom for myself, I must concede the same freedom to all
men .)
