MARK
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ing." The Antipodeans have no trouble getting along without a con–
cept of mind (or a philosophy of mind), and their "physicalism" does
not rob them of their dignity, because they have never thought to
wedge "the mind" between themselves and nature. Rorty's conclu–
sion is that if the Antipodeans do not have trouble living without
mind-body dualism, neither should we.
Without a mind-body problem, do we really have an "episte–
mological" problem either? The largest section of the book is devoted
to this question, for Rorty believes that, at least since Kant, univer–
sity philosophy has been obsessed with the pursuit of certainty in a
theory of knowledge, to the exclusion of almost all else. This is
perhaps most evident in moral philosophy in this century, where
persuasive discussions of the "good life" or of "right action" have been
generally abandoned for the meta-ethical question, "How can we
possibly
know
what is good and right?" As questions of content in the
realms of science, religion, and morals are reduced to "nothing but"
questions of method and certainty, we find that philosophy has re–
moved itself from mainstream cultural discourse and has substituted
"confrontation
for
conversation
as the determinate of our belief."
Philosophy had a chance to break out of this epistemological strait–
jacket with the writings of Nietzsche, Bergson, James, Dewey, and
Bradley, but the arrival of Russell and Husserl meant that "the spirit
of playfulness which seemed about to enter philosophy around 1900
was, however, nipped in the bud."
"Playfulness" was an unhappy word to choose, as was Rorty's
description of the proper role of philosophy professors as that of "in–
formed dilettantes." Critics have taken these sentences out of context
to charge Rorty unfairly with anti-intellectualism. For narrow in–
tellectual confrontation, Rorty wants to substitute a wide-ranging
hermeneutic conversation in which every realm of culture is brought
forward for discussion, explanation, and reasoned defense. He relies
on the continental conception of "hermeneutics," not as a method of
interpretation that establishes truth absolutely, but as a metaphor
for the kind of conversation which should take place in a healthy
culture : "Hermeneutics is what we get when we are no longer episte–
mological ."
The thought of giving up the search for firm foundations
frightens us somewhat, for the ocular metaphor of mind is, by now,
deeply ingrained in our culture (and metaphors can be more te–
nacious than ideas). In traditional psychoanalytic fashion, Rorty
